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ABSTRACT
At the most elementary level, this honors thesis is concerned with political tension
and its ability to procure political health. The study begins with a discussion in political
theory, examining the contemporary theory of agonism, which accepts conflict as an
inevitable fact of pluralist political society and defends it as necessary for the
maintenance of democracy. The study identifies agonism’s origins in the ancient Greek
agon, but also emphasizes that the first formal exposition of agonal political ideas comes
in Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy. It continues to work in the realm of theory, charting
moments of appreciation of agonal ideas, as well as a few moments of opposition to these
ideas, in modern Western political thought. In doing this, it highlights the point that
agonism and its main tenets are not just contemporary, radical, political ideas, but are
housed in, and relevant to, mainstream political thought. From here, the study moves into
a more practical analysis of how agonism applies to government and politics in the
United States of America. Ultimately, it asserts that an accommodation and appreciation
of political conflict or tension is deeply embedded in the American polity, and that, as
such, the American experiment in democracy is, more specifically, an experiment in
agonistic democracy. The study concludes with a conversation on the current state of
tension in the United States in the context of the polarized political climate. It suggests
that, as a result of polarization, tension in the U.S. is shifting from being agonistic in
nature, thereby securing vitality and longevity, to being antagonistic, which Machiavelli
and Mouffe warn will lead a republic to decay. Finally, it addresses why such a shift may
be occurring, and what steps might be taken to begin to reverse it.
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INTRODUCTION
“This animating principle doesn’t mean
that all Americans think alike.
It means that we have a tradition of conflict.”
-David Brooks, “What Moderation Means”
This study will commence with a melancholy political fact – democratic forms of
government will inevitably decay. This fact is communicated by a number of political
thinkers, including Polybius in his cycle of constitutions, as well as Machiavelli.
However, Machiavelli, among others, also observes that there is, in fact, an antidote to
constitutional decay. This antidote is political tension. “Antidote” is a particularly fitting
metaphor. As defined by the Oxford English Dictionary, an antidote is “a medicine given
to counteract the influence of poison, or an attack of disease.”1 In this vein, political
tension can act as an antidote to constitutional decay, and can procure political health.
The notion of political tension as an antidote to decay is not frequently acknowledged in
everyday political rhetoric. Unity, rather than tension, is more often associated with
political health. There is a tradition, however, that appreciates political tension as a means
to political health; this study, at its most elementary level, is concerned with that
tradition.
The inspiration behind this thesis came after reading an “op-ed” by David Brooks,
published in the New York Times in October of 2012. In the piece, entitled “What
Moderation Means,” Brooks offers his own definition of moderation. According to
Brooks, moderation does not entail “just finding the midpoint between two opposing

1“Antidote,

n.” OED Online. Oxford: Oxford University Press, March 2015. Web .
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poles and opportunistically planting yourself there.”2 Rather, in a liberal democracy, true
moderates try “to preserve the tradition of conflict, keeping the opposing sides balanced.3
Brooks goes on to say, “being moderate does not mean being tepid…The best moderates
can smash partisan categories and be hard-charging in two directions simultaneously.”4 In
this regard, the moderate’s accommodation of conflict produced a certain energy and
stability. After reading this piece, I noted that Brooks’ moderate seemed to exemplify an
appreciation of tension like that seen in Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy, albeit on
smaller, individual scale. Moreover, Brooks’ moderate also reflected an idea that I had,
for some reason, taken to be a fact – that tension, conflict, and paradox, are at the heart of
United States politics.5
As a student of both political theory and United States government, I have an
inclination to attempt to draw connections between abstract theories and modern day
American6 politics. It is in this vein that this study explores the contemporary theory of
agonism, charts its origins, and traces moments of appreciation of, and opposition to,
agonal ideas throughout modern political thought. Understanding others’ appreciation of
tension in politics facilitates one’s ability to appreciate tension in their own political
environment. As such, this study will eventually come to identify and appreciate conflict
and tension’s place in the American polity.
2

Brooks, David. “What Moderation Means,” New York Times, 25 Oct. 2012. Web.
Ibid
4 Ibid
5 Credit must go to Dr. Ann Serow of Kingswood Oxford School for highlighting the tensions and
paradoxes of American politics during an AP Political Science course taken during the 2010-2011
academic year and for including readings to this effect in her Lanahan Readings in the American Polity,
which was referenced frequently during this project.
6 Throughout this study “American” will refer to the United States of America. This usage is in no way
meant to diminish other “American” nations, including those in South or Latin American, but is rather used
for convenience (since there is no adjective form for United States) and to keep in line with much of the
related literature, which is cited.
3
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The study will be organized as follows – The first chapter will be dedicated to the
contemporary theory of agonism. It will define agonism, highlight its central tenets, and
explore some of the nuances of the agonal theories put forward by various thinkers. It
will go on to contrast agonism with other contemporary theories of politics, and will
conclude by identifying agonism’s origins in the Greek agon, its connection to Roman
Stoicism, and its first formal exposition in Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy. The
following chapter will explore Machiavelli’s claim that the stability and longevity of the
Roman republic was a product of the tension existing between the Senate and the people,
after which it will continue to trace moments of appreciation of agonal ideas through
modern Western political thought. It will then address a few moments of opposition to
agonal ideas to emphasize that, while the principles of agonal theory are appreciated in
the thought of some modern theorists, such an appreciation is not universal. The third and
final chapter will then turn to discuss agonal theory in relation to the United States. It will
argue that the way in which the American political system accommodates,
institutionalizes, and appreciates tension reveals that American democracy is notably
agonistic.
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CHAPTER I
Agonism — an Overview
“A well-functioning democracy calls
for a vibrant clash of democratic political positions.”
-Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox
This chapter will examine agonal theory. Its main undertaking will be defining
agonism, explaining its central tenets, and analyzing how it can manifest in modern
democracy. Following this, the chapter will briefly point out other theories of the political
that agonism is offered in contrast to. Finally, this chapter will seek to identify agonism
within broader political thought, emphasizing its Greek origins, its connection to Roman
Stoicism, and disclosing that the first formal and comprehensive statement of agonal
political ideas came from Machiavelli during the Italian Renaissance.
Agonism gets its root from the Greek word agon, which means conflict or strife,7
but the theory itself has gained significance as a political theory over the last twenty
years.8 The Encyclopedia of Political Theory simply introduces agonism as a theory that
emphasizes the importance of conflict to politics. Mark Wenman, in his book Agonistic
Democracy, describes agonism as having three primary elements –an understanding of
pluralism as fundamental, a tragic view of the world that sees conflict as inevitable, and a
belief that conflict can be politically beneficial.9 Another helpful description of agonism
is provided in Chapter 6 of Andrew Schaap’s Law & Agonistic Politics, titled “Polemos
and Agon,” where Adam Thomson outlines that agonism re-imagines the defining quality

7

Wenman, Mark, Agonistic Democracy Constituent Power in the Era of Globalisation; Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 4
8 Little, Adrian, Enduring Conflict Challenging the Signature of Peace and Democracy; Enduring Conflict
Challenging the Signature of Peace and Democracy. London; Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014, p. 73
9 Wenman, 28
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of democratic politics as its appreciation of tension, rather than its promotion of a notion
of a public and common good. He states,
Agonists aim to redefine the relationship between
democracy and politics. They share with many other
critical analyses on both left and right a sense that modern
democracy is not living up to its name. What makes their
position distinctive is that it calls for a revitalization of
modern democratic culture not in terms of the articulation
of public goods which exceed partisan interests, but
through a celebration of the continuous conflict of those
interests.10
In light of these definitions, as well as those put forth in the work of Chantal Mouffe,
Noel O’Sullivan, Andrew Schaap, and Adrian Little, most basically, agonism is a
political theory that acknowledges and accepts conflict as an inevitable fact of pluralist
society, and defends it as necessary for the maintenance of democracy, which is the
political form that scholars associate with agonism since it permits and promotes
pluralism.
In this context I am using a largely social definition of pluralism. Pluralism is
derived from the Latin word plures, meaning “several” or “many.” And as defined in the
Oxford English Dictionary, pluralism signifies “the existence or toleration of diversity
of… groups within a society or state, of beliefs or attitudes within a body or institution,
etc.”11 Therefore, as used here, pluralism will most basically denote the recognition or
toleration of unique, distinguishable parts, all of which exist within a political structure or
society.

10

Thomson, Adam. “Polemos and Agon,” Law and Agonistic Politics. Ed. Andrew Schaap. Abingdon,
UK: Ashgate Publishing Group, 2009; ProQuest ebrary, p. 107
11 “Pluralism, n.” OED Online. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014
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Returning to our examination of agonism, a deeper inspection of agonal thought
allows for various strands of agonism to be identified. The Encyclopedia of Political
Theory, in its page-long entry on agonism, distinguishes between descriptive agonism,
which admits conflict as necessary to politics, and normative agonism, which holds that
conflict has positive value and should be fostered and maintained in political systems.
And then, having made this distinction, it admits that often the two are combined.12
Admittedly, I struggle to appreciate any significant difference between descriptive and
normative forms of agonism. Of the agonist perspectives I have been exposed to, conflict
is regarded as inevitable and its maintenance has been deemed, at the very least, far
preferable to its eradication, if not generally beneficial. Any distinction between what is
politically necessary and politically positive does not seem to be especially substantial,
therefore blurring the lines of descriptive and normative.
For instance, The Encyclopedia associates two of the foremost agonal theorists
with these two “types” of agonism – William Connolly with descriptive agonism, and
Chantal Mouffe with normative. Connolly’s agonism, it states, comes out of his
criticisms of 1950’s and 1960’s pluralist theory. Connolly faulted pluralist theorists for
ignoring the power dynamics between the groups that constituted American society. For
Connolly, “politics was not simply a process for producing consensus, but rather a
conflict that might result in some groups imposing their preferred policies on others.”13
Therefore, Connolly instead promotes a notion of “agonistic respect,” which sees conflict
between groups as something to be maintained, rather than something to be overcome
through consensus, which would involve the domination of some groups over others. In
12“Agonism.”

Encyclopedia of Political Theory. Eds. Mark Bevir. London: SAGE, 2010; EBSCO
Publishing, p. 13
13 Ibid
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this vein, while I understand that Connolly’s agonism is born by his determination of
conflict as inevitable, it also seems normative, as it suggests that conflict ought to be
maintained for the benefit of pluralist politics. I therefore struggle to see why the
Encyclopedia qualifies it as less normative than Mouffe’s, which will be explored below.
Other sources draw other distinctions. Andrew Schaap’s introduction in Law and
Agonistic Politics, for instance, makes a distinction between pragmatic, expressivist, and
strategic agonism.14 According to Schaap, pragmatic agonism is best represented by
Chantal Mouffe who is one of the foremost scholars of agonism, with whom I began my
study of agonal theory. Since Mouffe is so pervasive throughout the literature on agonal
theory, and because she has been so central to my own understanding of agonal politics, I
shall attempt to flesh out all that I have gathered from my readings of her work.
In prescribing “agonistic pluralism,” Mouffe boldly seeks to reject both traditional
liberalism and “third-way” prescriptions of democratic politics, which attempt to
eliminate conflict and contest. Mouffe finds such attempts overly moralistic, naïve, and
unrealistic, given the realities of social relations within pluralist democracy. In fact, as the
Encyclopedia of Political Theory explains in its entry on agonism, for Mouffe, “a
properly political pluralism must countenance different positions that are genuinely
incompatible with one another, that is to say, positions that may come into conflict with
one another.”15 Anything that is “political,” according to Mouffe, is marked by this
ineradicable conflict. Mouffe distinguishes “the political” from “politics”. What Mouffe
means by this perhaps pedantic, certainly confusing, distinction is that “the political”

14 Law

and Agonistic Politics. Eds. Andrew Schaap 1972-, Inc ebrary, and EBSCO Publishing (Firm).
Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2009. Web, p. 1
15“Agonism.” Encyclopedia of Political Theory. Eds. Mark Bevir. London: SAGE, 2010; EBSCO
Publishing, p. 13
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refers to the “antagonisms” inherent to the human social relations within pluralist
democracies, which cannot be eliminated, while “politics,” on the other hand, Mouffe
describes as “the ensemble of practices, discourses and institutions, which seek to
establish a certain order and organize human coexistence, in conditions that are always
potentially conflictual because they are affected by the dimension of ‘the political.’”16 As
such, “politics” is constantly affected by the antagonisms inherent to human society; it,
along with its institutions, conversations, and processes, is concerned with internalizing,
institutionalizing, and controlling the antagonistic relations that are inherent to “the
political.”
As Mouffe outlines in The Democratic Paradox, by “providing channels through
which collective passions will be given ways to express themselves over issues”17 politics
may succeed in its aims, and antagonistic relations can be transformed into agonistic
ones. The distinction here (again, it is confusing for the reader) is that antagonistic
relations are more akin to the relationship between enemies – the goal of each being to
delegitimize and destroy the other – while agonistic relations, on the other hand, more
closely resemble the relationship between adversaries. “Agonism is a we/they relation
where the conflicting parties, although acknowledging that there is no rational solution to
their conflict, nevertheless recognize the legitimacy of their opponents. They are
‘adversaries’ not enemies.”18 It is at this point that one can identify (the former Nazi
apologist) Carl Schmitt’s influence on Mouffe, and also recognize where Mouffe departs
from Schmitt. Schmitt understands the political as the story of conflict between friend

16

Mouffe, Chantal. The Democratic Paradox. London; New York: Verso, 2009, p. 101
Ibid, 103
18 Mouffe, Chantal. On the Political. London: Routledge, 2005, p. 20
17
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and foe. And Schmitt argues that this story will always end with the domination of one,
and the destruction of the other. Mouffe agrees that the political, and therefore politics, is
a story of conflict. But she rejects the idea that it must end with a stark dichotomy of
victory and defeat. Instead, Mouffe presents an option of a sustained, “respectful”
conflict that will not be eliminated, but will rage on in a controlled fashion.
Pausing briefly, I’ll attempt to put forth a quick summary of my account of
Mouffe’s agonal theory so far. Mouffe has suggested that given the realities of pluralist
democratic society, conflict is inevitable. As such, the task of politics is to channel this
conflict through institutions and processes that serve as “a political outlet within a
pluralistic democratic system.”19 Politics carves out a place for dissent, institutionalizing
it, a process that Mouffe argues is “vital for a pluralist democracy.”20
Mouffe presents this idea of ‘agonistic pluralism’ in contrast to Schmitt’s notion
of politics as mortal-combat between enemies, as well as other attempts that emphasize
consensus and rationality, including those put forward by liberals like John Rawls, and
proponents of “deliberative democracy,” like Jürgen Habermas. Mouffe regards the latter
theories as failed attempts for “consensus without exclusion,” and argues that they merely
attempt to eliminate the realities of “the political” – of social relations – from “politics”.21
Mouffe’s program, on the other hand, claims to account for the conflictual
realities of human political relations and does not seek to establish a deep-seeded
consensus as a result. Instead, she states that it attempts to foster unity in “a context of

19

Mouffe, Chantal. The Return of the Political. London: Verso, 1993, p. 5
Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 105
21 Ibid, 48-49
20
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conflict and diversity.”22 The following is my interpretation of what Mouffe means by
this. Mouffe’s agonism accepts compromises as “part and parcel of politics,” but
emphasizes these as “temporary respites in an ongoing confrontation.”23 And, moreover,
it seems as though meaningful consensus can only appear in two forms. The first is what
Mouffe calls a ‘conflictual consensus’.24 What she seems to mean by this is that there
should be a general agreement on what the ‘ethico-political principles’ are – for instance
liberty and equality in liberal democracy – but disagreement “concerning the meaning
and implementation of those principles.”25 The second form of consensus accepted by
Mouffe is a sort of mutual agreement that accepts difference as legitimate and consents to
the continuation of a mutual struggle among competing values and interests. Put in
colloquial terms, it seems to be an agreement to disagree. Therefore, while there can be
moments of agreement within politics, they only exist within the reality of conflict and
disagreement.
As mentioned above, while many popular political theories might be apprehensive
about such discord, Mouffe treats it as necessary for the maintenance of democratic forms
of rule. In The Democratic Paradox she boldly states, “a well-functioning democracy
calls for a vibrant clash of democratic political positions.”26 Additionally, she shares three
warnings for what could happen to democracies if conflict is repressed or eradicated.
First, she suggests that if democracy lacks clashing political positions, it may instead be

22

Ibid, 102
Ibid
24 Ibid, 103
25 Ibid, 102
26 Ibid, 104
23
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marked by “a confrontation among other forms of collective identification.”27 She fails to
explain what these would be in The Democratic Paradox, but it seems to me that
religious groups or other extra-political organizations and identities might be what she
has in mind. Her second warning is that a marked emphasis on consensus, at the expense
of dissention and discord, may lead to “apathy” and “disaffection with political
participation.”28 Her ‘agonistic pluralism’, on the contrary, affords the presence of
choices within politics, and outlines options for decisions to be made between, thus
encouraging participation and procuring the vibrant democracy mentioned above. The
final warning is that political repression of conflict may cause the “crystallization of
collective passions around issues that cannot be managed by the democratic process.”29
She again fails to flesh out what these “issues” would be, but she seems to be implying
political extremism. It seems, therefore, by affording conflict within politics, agonism
prevents citizens from turning to extremist groups that lay outside political institutions.
Up until now, this section on Mouffe has focused on her work as theoretical and
remarkably broad. From this perspective, it is hard to imagine what agonism would look
like, or how deep-seeded conflict would truly play out under ‘agonistic’ pluralism. But
Mouffe begins to take on this project in The Democratic Paradox, examining how
agonism appears within liberal democracy specifically. Mouffe explains that as societies
have grown larger and more complex, democracy has evolved. She outlines that modern
democracy is the product of two unique traditions – the liberal and democratic traditions.
Mouffe states,

27

Ibid
Ibid
29 Ibid
28
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with modern democracy, we are dealing with a new political
form of society whose specificity comes from the
articulation between two different traditions. On one side we
have the liberal tradition constituted by the rule of law, the
defense of human rights, and the respect of individual
liberty; on the other, the democratic tradition whose main
ideas are those of equality, identity between governing and
governed and popular sovereignty.30
Mouffe identifies a “tension” between these “different logics” of the liberal and
democratic institutions of modern democracy.31 From here, Mouffe argues that we must
understand that liberal democracy is the result of an articulation of two incompatible
traditions, which cannot, and can never be, entirely reconciled. Tension between liberal
and democratic traditions can only be “temporarily stabilized through pragmatic
negotiations between political forces.”32 Because of this “constitutive tension,” liberaldemocratic regimes are marked by frequent struggles. However, Mouffe argues that these
struggles have been the “driving forces of historical political developments.”33 And she
continues by saying that only recently has this tension been rejected. Mouffe sees
attempts to eradicate such tension emerging out of neo-liberalism.
Mouffe’s claims have political aims; she is arguing against the “unchallenged
hegemony” of neo-liberalism, which she views as threat to democratic institutions.
Mouffe believes that the neoliberal perspective has promulgated the abandonment of the
“traditional liberal struggle of the left for equality.”34 She sees a movement towards an
increasingly “one dimensional” world, and calls for the end of this trend. As such, in true
agonist form, she also rejects the “rational consensus” and “deliberative” theories of the
30

Ibid, 2-3
Ibid, 4
32 Ibid
33 Ibid, 5
34 Ibid, 6
31
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political. She comments that these models fail to understand the true dynamics of
democratic politics, discussed earlier, which are characterized by contestation. Mouffe
states that the rationalist approach is blind to the agonistic nature of the political – this
blindness has serious consequences for democratic politics.35 Similarly, proponents of
“deliberative democracy,” fail to understand that tension is an inherent aspect of modern
democracies, due to the liberal-democratic paradox discussed above. Mouffe sees any
attempts to permanently quell this tension, like those of John Rawls or Jürgen Habermas,
as simply favoring one side over the other – she argues that Rawls favors liberalism,
while Habermas favors democracy.
What Mouffe presents for liberal-democracy instead is not “the search for an
inaccessible consensus…but an ‘agonistic confrontation’ between conflicting
interpretations of the constitutive liberal-democratic values.”36 This is the reemergence
and manifestation of Mouffe’s manifesto for ‘agonistic pluralism’. To revisit what this
means, Mouffe is advocating the notion that “pluralist democratic politics consists in
pragmatic, precarious and necessarily unstable forms of negotiating its constitutive
paradox.”37 Ultimately, Mouffe sees this program as a means of again rejecting Carl
Schmitt; this time, she rejects his specific condemnation of democracy as a “non-viable
regime.”38 (Schmitt believes that liberal-democracy cannot sustain this tension between
liberty and equality, and argues that eventually one value must win out over the other.
The dominance of equality, Schmitt believes, will lead popular government towards
tyranny, while the dominance of liberty will move popular government towards anarchy.)
35

Ibid, 11
Ibid, 9
37 Ibid, 11
38 Ibid, 9
36
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Therefore, the tension between liberalism and democracy, for Schmitt, is the terminal
“mode of contradiction.”39 For Mouffe, on the other hand, this tension is the “locus of
paradox.” 40 As such, Mouffe is interpreting the tension of liberal-democracy as a positive
political condition. This is evident when she states,
by constantly challenging the relations of inclusionexclusion implied by the political constitution of ‘the
people’ – required by the exercise of democracy – the
liberal discourse of universal human rights plays an
important role in maintaining the democratic contestation
alive. On the other side, it is only thanks to the democratic
logics of equivalence that frontiers can be created and a
demos established without which no real exercise of
human rights could be possible.41
Mouffe acknowledges that, in truth, the conflictual nature of the relationship between
liberalism and democracy will prevent each from being entirely realized. “Both perfect
liberty and perfect equality become impossible. But this is the very condition of
possibility for a pluralist form of human coexistence in which rights can exist and be
exercised, in which freedom and equality somehow manage to coexist.”42 When one
accepts the conflict and division inherent to liberal-democracies, they can then
understand how modern liberal democracy “creates a space in which this confrontation is
kept open, power relations are always being put into question, and no victory can be
final.”43
Mouffe’s commentary on the liberal-democratic paradox is relevant to my own
thesis that tension lies at the center of the American polity, and is engrained in American

39
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41 Ibid, 10
42 Ibid, 11
43 Ibid
40

14

politics as a result. The paradoxical nature of the relationship between liberty and
equality is an idea that has been introduced throughout my studies of American political
thought, most notably through the work of Alexis de Tocqueville. Thus, what I find even
more interesting than Mouffe’s acknowledgement of the liberal-democratic paradox, is
that Tocqueville is absent from it. This will be discussed again in the chapter on
Tocqueville’s thought specifically, but it is worth mentioning here, especially since the
current chapter will soon consider how agonism appears in broader political thought.
Tocqueville distinctly accommodates the tension between liberty and equality within his
political thought, and yet he is not mentioned or cited once in Mouffe’s book that is all
about the tension that exists between liberty and equality (referring to The Democratic
Paradox). For Tocqueville, though the two political values do not always lend
themselves to one another, democracy is best maintained when equality and liberty are
properly balanced, when a maintainable tension between the two values is sustained. To
me, this sounds remarkably akin to what Mouffe advocates for liberal-democracy by
putting forth her prescription of ‘agonistic pluralism’.
Having come to the end of this brief critique on the absence of Tocqueville, this
study’s analysis of Chantal Mouffe’s particular agonal perspective – which Andrew
Schaap calls “pragmatic agonism” – is complete. And as such, it will now briefly outline
the other agonal perspectives that Schaap points out. The first of these is expressivist
agonism. Schaap holds that expressivist agonism is represented, most notably, by
William Connolly. Expressivist theories are heavily grounded in an appreciation of
pluralism. Theories that fall under expressivist agonism, as stated by Schaap,
emphasize the value of struggle in sustaining freedom and
plurality and resisting social identities that may be

15

experienced as oppressive. The agon is celebrated as a
never-ending play of differences, which resists the
homogenizing drive for social unity, enabling plurality to
flourish.44
The aim of politics, for expressive agonism, is to promote pluralism; accepting conflict
within the realm of the politics is determined as necessary for the sake of pluralism.
The second of the remaining theories of agonism presented by Schaap is strategic
agonism. Schaap states that this theoretical perspective is advocated in the work of
Jacque Ranciere, who, admittedly, I have not come across before finding him mentioned
by Schaap. As Schaap outlines, strategic perspectives of agonism see conflict within
politics as a means to protect against social exclusion or domination. For example, this
theory of agonism could imagine a situation in which conflict occurring between first and
second-class citizens, between those who are included and those who are excluded from
politics, works “to abolish the social inequalities between them.”45 As such, for strategic
agonists, conflict can help secure democratic ideas of equality and inclusion.
I have not gone through the task of analyzing either expressivist agonism or
strategic agonism as deeply as I have pragmatic agonism, as put forward by Mouffe. I
have more fully expounded on Mouffe because she is more relevant to my own argument.
So far, this chapter has introduced agonism, explained its core ideas, and has
acknowledged and explored some of its various forms and perspectives. Now, it will
move to a brief discussion of the theories of democratic politics that agonism is offered in
contrast to. First, agonism is offered in stark contrast to the neoliberal perspective of
democratic politics. Centered on the formation of a rational consensus based on universal
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principles of justice and led by one of the foremost post-war liberal thinkers, John Rawls,
this tradition envisions that justice is achieved when individual rights are obtained, and
maintained, through a society that has eliminated conflict by reaching “a rational
consensus grounded on universally valid moral principles.”46 Rawls in particular is
concerned with how peaceful coexistence may be fostered among a population with
numerous, different conceptions of the good.47 Previous authors had described democracy
as having the procedural ability to regulate such a conflict of views in a neutral fashion;
Rawls rejects this and argues for a more meaningful, pervasive consensus to be formed,
one based on “moral, albeit minimal, consensus on political fundamentals.”48 And in his
book, Political Liberalism, Rawls brings this to light with his notion of reasonable
pluralism. Under reasonable pluralism, which results from the exercise of reason, people
have realized their moral principles and, as such, are free and equal citizens in a
constitutional regime; cooperation is their creed. Chantal Mouffe critically comments that
with Rawls’ reasonable pluralism, “political liberalism can provide consensus among
reasonable persons who, by definition, are persons who accept the principles of political
liberalism.”49 More generally, a main objection to Rawls’ reasonable pluralism, and the
broader neo-Kantian, rational consensus tradition is the heavy, sometimes overpowering
presence of moral, rather than political, considerations. Some, including Reinhardt
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Koselleck, make this critique to such an extent that they express a belief that this tradition
misunderstands the purely political.50
The second concept of democratic politics that agonism is offered in contrast to is
called discourse theory,51 or as Mouffe refers to it, deliberative democracy. Pursued most
prominently by Jürgen Habermas, discourse theory contends that unrestricted
participation in a process of free and rational public discourse is necessary to secure
legitimacy in a modern democratic state. Rather than viewing the political as the forum
for individual rights, Habermas understands the political as the source of people’s
identity as free and equal political agents. It is through political life, most ideally a
political life centered on transparent and open communication, that social character and
personal identity are secured. 52 Mouffe explains that the main idea behind deliberative
democracy is that in a democratic polity decisions should be reached through a process of
deliberation among free and equal citizens.”53 And while this notion of deliberation has
been central to democracy since its inception in 5th century Athens, how ‘deliberation’
has been interpreted and defined has vastly differed.
Noel O’Sullivan discloses three common problems associated with discourse
theory as presented by Habermas. The first is similar to the objections to Rawls’ rational
consensus presented previously; discourse theory seems to assume that a set of neutral
procedural principles can be reached, despite the vast diversity associated with modern
society. Second, critics take issues with Habermas’ idea that the formation of a universal
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“rational will” is feasible. Third, Habermas’ discourse theory makes a leap that
transparent communication will naturally lead to consensus and uniformity. O’Sullivan
states, “It is not clear, however, why Habermas ignores the possibility that transparency,
even if it can be achieved, might not bring conflict and hatred instead of harmony,”54
exemplifying this by describing the relationship between Israel and Palestine – the two
“understand each other very well, but this does not guarantee a solution of any kind to
their conflict.”55
Chantal Mouffe notes that agonal theory is also presented in contrast to a third
democratic theory – the aggregate model of democracy. The aggregate model predates
the rational consensus and deliberative models, which are offered as alternatives to it.
This theory, which was presented in Joseph Schumpeter’s Capitalism, Socialism and
Democracy (1942), focuses on the empirical rather than the normative; it understands the
democratic process as one which is not centered on popular sovereignty, but on the
“aggregation of preferences, taking place through political parties for which people
would have the capacity to vote at regular intervals.”56 In this vein, notions of a “common
good” or “general will” are subjugated to special interests. ”Pluralism of interests and
values ha[s] to be acknowledged as coextensive with the very idea of ‘the people.’”57
While Mouffe presents the aggregate model in contrast to agonal theory, I
struggle to understand them as definitively distinct. Mouffe believes that the aggregate
model shares some of the flaws of the rational consensus and deliberative democracy
theories, namely that the aggregate model still privileges rationality, forgetting the
54
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massive effects of the passions. But while Mouffe says that the aggregate model relies
too heavily on rationality, I do not see the model she purposes as any less rational.
Moreover, even if one believes that special interests only result from rational thought, a
belief I find to be a bit naïve, surely one cannot reject the role that the passions play in the
party politics that lie at the center of the aggregate model. Turning back to Mouffe’s
criticisms of the aggregate model, she also takes issue with the increased individualism
that results out of an aggregate model of democracy. She advocates for the active
involvement of citizens in a democracy, and argues that this kind of participation can
only be procured “by multiplying the institutions, the discourses, the forms of life that
foster identification with democratic values.”58 But why can’t special interests or political
parties foster an identification with democratic valued? And if conflicting political
parties and special interests are acknowledged as inherent to politics, are they not the
manifestation of multiplied institutions? Do they not represent an increase in discourses?
Finally, how can they be distinguished from the “pluralism” central to Mouffe’s agonal
theory?
So far, this chapter has described agonism and its central ideas, and presented
other theories of democratic politics that lie in contrast to agonism. It will now turn to
identifying where agonism sits within broader political theory. As stated at the start of
this chapter, agonism gets its name from the Greek agon. Andreas Kalyvas, in his chapter
of Schaap’s Law and Agonistic Politics, suggests that agonism descends from Greek
Antiquity. As Kalyvas points out, agon in ancient Greece meant conflict or struggle, and
he puts forth that agon was used in reference to athletic competitions, oral debates, or the
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competition between characters in literature.59 In defending a position similar to
Kalyvas’, Mark Wenman explains that in Greek antiquity, agonism appeared as “the
contest between adversaries in the athletic games and rivalry among characters in tragic
drama.”60 In this light, agon seems to have referred to the struggle of individuals, and of
their individual souls. But neither Kalyvas nor Wenman point out any political
connotation, much less one that celebrates the effects of tension.
One can see an example of this description of the agon, which focuses on tension
on an individual level, by looking to the second century Greek stoic Chryssipus.
Chryssipus, it is important to note, does present a concept of positive tension. As Wendell
John Coats, Jr. explains in an endnote in his essay, “A Theory of Republican Character,”
Chryssipus puts forward a notion that moderate tension can be a source of health and
order.61 According to Chryssipus, men’s wrongdoings, shortcomings, or failures are the
result of a lack, or collapse, of tension in the soul. Right actions, on the other hand, are
“guided by right judgment together with the soul’s good tension.”62 This appreciation of
tension within the soul seems to emerge out of Stoic ideas on physics, specifically those
relating to the elements. In A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley’s The Hellenistic Philosophers, it
is noted that stoic philosophy distinguishes the elements of fire and air from those of
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earth and water. Fire and air are said to sustain themselves because of a sort of tensile
breath. 63 A description of this breath states,
‘Breath’ consists of a ‘through-and-through blending’ of its
two constitutive elements, which means that any portion of
it, irrespective of size, is characterized by hot and cold.
Chryssipus deduces from this that ‘breath’ is a dynamic
continuum, in part expanding from its heat (fire) and in part
contracting from its cold (air). This complex motion was
described as ‘tension’ or ‘tensile movement’… The special
character of this motion is its simultaneous activity in
opposite directions, outwards and inwards…the stoics
explained the apparent stability and properties of everyday
objects by the ‘tensile movement’ of their constituent
elements.64
Herein, tension equates to stability, signaling an appreciation of tension in Chryssipus’
stoicism. However, his praise of tension is limited to tension within the natural world of
elements or within the soul of individuals. It never touches on tension within society as a
whole or in the realm of politics.
Friedrich Nietzsche, however, broadens what the Greek agon signified, explaining
that it applies to the political sphere as well.65 As Lawrence J. Hatab writes in his 2008
work, Nietzsche’s On The Genealogy of Morality, “Nietzsche spotlights the pervasiveness
in ancient Greece of the agon, or contest for excellence, which operated in all cultural
pursuits (in athletics, the arts, oratory, politics, and philosophy).”66 The agon seems to
have entertained the idea of the world as a forum for “the struggle of opposing (but
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related) forces,”67 and is evident in Homer’s Iliad, Hesiod’s Theogony, Greek tragedy, as
well as in the work of philosophers, including Anaximander and Heraclitus.68 Moreover,
the Greek agon, as explored by Nietzsche, seems to have made a distinction that is
notably similar to Mouffe’s distinction between agonism and antagonism. Hatab speaks
to this, saying:
In Homer’s Contest, Nietzsche argues that the agon
emerged as a cultivation of more brutal natural drives in not
striving for the annihilation of the Other, but arranging
contests that would test skill and performance in
competition. Accordingly, agonistic strife produced
excellence, not obliteration, since talent unfolded in a
struggle with competitors. In this way, the Greeks did not
succumb to a false idea of sheer harmony, and so they
insured a proliferation of excellence by preventing
stagnation and uniform control. The agon expressed the
general resistance of the Greeks to “unified domination”
and the danger of unchallenged or unchallengeable
power.69
However, despite Nietzsche’s explanation of the Greek agon and its application to
politics, there was “no political philosophy of agonism” in ancient Greece, nor is there
any literature that seems to have been specifically devoted to it.70 One should also note
that the two giants of Greek political thought, Plato and Aristotle, did not afford any
room for tension or conflict in politics.
Looking back to 4th Century BCE, Plato’s writing in The Republic emphasizes
that his political philosophy has little tolerance for pluralism, much less tension. Plato
writes with justice as his end. The perfect city, which Plato depicts in The Republic, is
just and good. In being both just and good it is perfectly ordered according to nature.
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This, moreover, is consistent with his analysis of justice in the individual as well, which
may be useful to explore before turning to the city. It is important to mention that
although Plato seems to recognize ‘parts’ of the city and of the soul, his thought does not
fully accommodate pluralism. As represented in The Republic, Plato’s political
philosophy still emphasizes unity and condemns “divisions [as] morally unwholesome
and politically fatal.”71 Plato’s just city features “an organic body politic, an indivisible
nation (or people), unitary royal[s] …[and] one determinable common good.”72 And most
importantly, for Plato, “parts must be cast as natural, unalterable elements of an
indivisible city or soul.”73
I will look to Plato’s teachings on the soul first. Through Socrates’ dialectic
argument with Adeimantus and Glaucon, Plato extols that for the individual “justice is
respect to what is within”74 and that, to achieve justice within, one must properly order the
parts of the soul. By ordering the soul, one becomes their own sovereign entity. The
notion that a proper ordering of the appetites of the soul - both the necessary and
unnecessary desires - produces justice is thoroughly discussed in Book IV He doesn’t let...the three classes of the soul meddle with
each other, but really sets his own...in good order and rules
himself; he arranges himself...and harmonizes the three
parts... And if there are some other parts in between, he
binds them together and becomes entirely one from the
many, moderate and harmonized. 75
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Through the perfect moderation and harmonization of the reasoning, the spirited, and the
desiring, the soul of an individual can be just. And as Socrates states, for Plato, “the just
man [is] not any different from the just city.”76 Exactly as a just soul, by being properly
ordered, becomes a sovereign entity unto itself, a properly ordered city will also become
sovereign and just. Again, identically to the soul of an individual, “one would find many
diverse desires, pleasures, and pains”77 within a city. To obtain justice, consequently, the
city must properly organize its parts. Socrates remarks that a city must have its better
parts ruling over the worse78 and should be “entirely moderate.”79 Moderation in service
of the unity of a city will make that city just, precisely as moderation in service of unity
within an individual soul made that soul just. As just is virtually synonymous with good –
moderation and harmony, or unanimity, will make for a good city. Herein, Plato’s
political thought does not accommodate pluralism. Furthermore, it embraces “harmony”
and “moderation” and thereby eschews any sort of tension or conflict.
Aristotle, Plato’s most famous student, parts slightly with his teacher by
accommodating pluralism in his own political thought. The mixed regime that Aristotle
puts forth in Politics accommodates “social divisions within the frame of government”80
Moreover, while Plato, in the Republic, had characterized factions or parts in a city or
soul as markers of injustice and advocated for unity, Aristotle sees things differently. For
him, “the distribution of virtue required for unity was inconceivable.”81 Instead, Aristotle
accepts the presence of parts within society as a fact. He recognizes discrete social
76
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groupings and conflicting interests, and treats them as inevitable aspects of human
society.
But Aristotle still by no means accommodates conflict or tension within his
politics. True, he accepts parts, but he asserts that they must be tempered, ordered and
moderated. Nancy Rosenblum comments in her book, On the Side of the Angels, that for
Aristotle, “the Polis is a compound whole composed of differentiated parts… differences
[are] acknowledged and brought into government…the public good is a judicious
arrangement of heterogeneous parts.”82 In Politics, Aristotle discusses the possible
regime types, including monarchy, aristocracy, constitutional government [polity], and
their respective inversions, tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy. Through this discussion
Aristotle concludes that the best of the practicable constitutions is a polity (but this is still
far from the “absolute best regime” that he presents). And even this practicable polity of
Books III and IV of Politics, which unlike his best regime is not aimed at absolute
excellence, still relies of the virtue of moderation. As stated by one commentator, the
virtues that a polity is supposedly capable of,
are more defined by their usefulness in holding together a
body politic than by their similarity to self-contained and
self-sufficient divine-like virtues, capable of being done for
their own sake.83
Aristotle’s polity works to create a sense of balance and a moderate outcome; an end
goal of unity underscores his thought.
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Identifying that the two foremost classical Greek political theorists neither
afforded nor appreciated tension within politics denotes a gap in where agonism can be
identified in ancient Greece. As Kalyvas admits,
one has to revisit Greek antiquity and to sift through
fragmented and dispersed textual and material sources in
mythology, poetry, theatre, rhetoric, historiography,
philosophy, visual representation, architecture and
archaeology and try to combine and interpret the findings
into an eclectic, tentative and uncertain framework that
cannot but accept its own unavoidable arbitrariness.84
But at least some ancient Greek political thought, seen above in the discussion of the
agon, particularly as it was described by Nietzsche, accepted an “ idea that conflict,
suffering, and strife are endemic in social and political life and not a contemporary
condition on a journey towards reconciliation.”85
Moving on from agonism’s origins in the Greek agon, agonism appears to have a
connection to Roman Stoicism as well. As put to words by Cicero, Roman Stoicism
exhibits another acceptance and appreciation of tension. As Coats argues in his essay
“Groundwork for a Theory of Republican Character in a Democratic Age,” Roman
Stoicism holds that a well-maintained tension within the body and soul helps to resist the
corruptive effects that pleasure and pain have on one’s character.86 Coats quotes Cicero in
the Tusculan Disputations on this point. Cicero states, “the soul must strain every nerve
in the performance of its duties; in this alone does duty find its safeguard.”87 Discipline,
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like military discipline or that obtained through oratory, would help procure and sustain
tension. This still marks just a momentary appreciation of tension that is operating on the
individual level. But since internal tension helps the individual to succeed in civil life, it
has implications for the political realm as well.
However, agonistic political ideas do not receive a comprehensive, formal
introduction until the modern era when Machiavelli comments on the discord between the
Senate and the plebs of Rome in his Discourses on Livy. This connection (which even
Mouffe notes), in addition to the connections discussed above, allows one to recognize
agonism as an offspring of more mainstream political thought, rather than casting it off as
a contemporary, radical, fringe theory. In fact, the central tenets of agonism – that tension
is an inevitable fact of pluralist political society and is a necessary or even positive force
in politics – appear in the thought of numerous modern political thinkers. This brings to
light that, despite the fact that agonism has only gained significance as a political theory
over the last 20 years, the central ideas of agonism may not be entirely original. Although
the consolidation of its central ideas into one formalized theory is novel, as the next
chapter will emphasize, the ideas that constitute agonism have been said before.
The question, therefore, is where and by whom have these agonal ideas been put
forward? In his Agonistic Democracy, Mark Wenman states that agonism “represents a
contemporary adaptation of republican theory.”88 And similarly, Gulshan Khan, in his
article “Critical republicanism: Jürgen Habermas and Chantal Mouffe,” points out that
within republicanism there is an acknowledgement of “ the value of non-violent conflict
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in the public realm.”89 True, rather than viewing conflict as inherently detrimental, many
republican theorists see “contestation and disagreement as a productive force by which to
strengthen a free state.”90 And agonal theory can clearly be associated with the broad
republican tradition. However, I believe that agonism’s roots are not solely republican. Its
forefather (speaking of Machiavelli) may have been a republican, but not all its ancestors
were. As the following chapter will emphasize, theorists across a number of schools of
modern political thought include some sort of appreciation of conflict and tension in their
work. This ultimately underscores that agonal theory is relevant to politics in a broader
way than one might imagine, and it should not be solely examined in the context of
radical democratic theory, or even republicanism, but placed in dialogue with the much
broader modern political tradition.
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CHAPTER II
Agonism in Modern Political Thought: Moments of Appreciation and
Opposition
“Seeing then the impossibility of establishing in this respect a perfect equilibrium, and
that a precise middle course cannot be maintained…I believe it therefore necessary
rather to take the constitution of Rome as a model than that of any other republic.”
–Niccolo Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy
This chapter is focused on identifying agonal theory within modern Western
political tradition. It will examine a statement made towards the end of the previous
chapter that identified Machiavelli as the forefather of agonal theory. From this point it
will chart other moments of appreciation of tension amongst Machiavelli’s
contemporaries, and then mention a few moments of opposition, as agonal ideas are not
universally accepted by all modern political theorists.
Machiavelli
Machiavelli, having written his magisterial Discourses on Livy in the 16th century,
is credited as being “the most influential early modern republican.”91 However, many
solely remember Machiavelli as a schemer operating in the vice driven undercurrents of
Renaissance politics, motivated by power and avarice. To these people, he is the author
of The Prince; the father of the notion that it is better to be feared than loved.92 This
painting of Machiavelli seems dark, emphasizing the shadowy aspects of Machiavelli’s
thought. Upon closer inspection, however, Machiavelli’s political thought may not be
quite so stark. Instead, Machiavelli may be a human example of pentimento. An art term,
pentimento describes a sign or trace in an artistic work of an alteration, mistake, or earlier

91“Machiavelli.”

Encyclopedia of Political Theory. Eds. Mark Bevir. London: SAGE, 2010; EBSCO
Publishing, p. 1192
92 Machiavelli, Niccolo, The Prince. Trans. Ricci, Luigi. New York: McGraw-Hill Higher Education,
1950, Chapter XVII

30

composition, seen through surface layers of paint on a canvas.93 While on the surface
Machiavelli was the seemingly immoral architect behind The Prince, careful and critical
inspection allows one to see the lighter tones of his thought emerging from the
background.
As Harvey Mansfield argues in the preface to his book New Modes and Orders: A
Study of the Discourses on Livy, to appreciate Machiavelli’s broad contributions to
political thought, especially to the American tradition, one need look beyond the “vulgar”
conception of Machiavelli as “a teacher of evil.”94 In perceiving that Machiavelli did not
aim to introduce “evil” into politics, but instead aimed to introduce republicanism into
renaissance politics, one can better appreciate these contributions. In fact, as Harvey
Mansfield states, one “can learn to see how the control of things not previously or usually
thought political is represented in his discussion of political things.”95 In this vein, this
chapter will argue that Machiavelli is the first to explicitly introduce tension as an aspect
of the political. It will then examine Machiavelli’s comments on the usefulness of
controlling, or maintaining, well-balanced tension to conclude that Machiavelli is the
forefather of modern agonal political thought.
Machiavelli’s thoughts on tension in politics are most obvious in Book I of the
Discourses on the Ten Books of Titus Livy. Despite the fact that The Prince often
outshines the Discourses as Machiavelli’s most infamous work, the latter has been
regarded as the truest to his actual political thinking. From this perspective, the
Discourses exhibits Machiavelli’s preference for republican schemes of government and
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explains how they might be maintained. As Maurizio Viroli points out in his biography of
Machiavelli, entitled Niccolo’s Smile, “the Discourses became an intellectual and
political guide for all those who embraced the ideals of republican liberty and sought…to
replace the rule of princes and kings with free republics.”96
Machiavelli details the history of the Roman republic not in an effort to simply
recount what has already been written down, but rather, to “persuade his readers of the
political wisdom of the Romans and to move his readers to imitate them.”97 It is with this
in mind that one can more fully appreciate Machiavelli’s novel statement that the stability
and longevity of the Roman republic was a product of the tension existing between the
Senate and the people, and that it was this that kept the republic free, and allowed it to
avoid stagnancy and delay decay.98 In this statement, Machiavelli is introducing tension
as inherent to the political. As Gisela Bock points out in her chapter on civil discord in
Machiavelli and Republicanism, Machiavelli demonstrates “the intrinsic conflictuality of
the political universe.”99 And from there he goes further, advocating that by controlling
or maintaining well-balanced political tension, a republic may flourish.
Underlying Machiavelli’s appreciation of tension is an accommodation of
pluralism. In The Discourses on Livy, Machiavelli describes the plebs and the grandi of
Rome as distinct social groups and accepts the existence and legitimacy of both.
Machiavelli, however, not only accepts pluralism, but also accepts and appreciates the
tension that results from such pluralism, which he regards as inevitable, noting that the
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nobility and the people had long been at ends. Machiavelli rejects unity as essentially
impossible. Exemplifying this through the Roman example, he observes that when the
Tarquins were expelled there seemed to be a “very great union” between the plebs and
the Senate. However, he casts this aside as an untruthful aberration; the Senate was
merely attempting to secure the plebs as allies. Following the death of the Tarquins, “the
nobles began to spit out the venom against the plebs which they had held in their breasts
and harmed it in every way they could.”100 For Machiavelli, therefore, unity can only be
the product of deceit. Disunion and the tension that results from disunion are inevitable
and inherent to politics. But Machiavelli does not treat disunion, as represented by the
“quarrels of the Senate and the people of Rome,” as terribly destructive. In this vein, he
separates himself from those in the classical tradition who would view such a conflict as
purely negative, disorderly, and turbulent101– referring to Plato and Aristotle in particular.
While Plato and Aristotle would have seen the disunion between the Senate and the plebs
as an imminent threat, Machiavelli praises it.
Here, the novelty of Machiavelli’s commentary on the discord between the Senate
and the plebs of Rome becomes even more evident. For him, this civil discord was “the
leaven and cement of a free republic.”102 He is sure to point out that the disunion seems to
have brought about little harm; it did not bring about exile or death, nor did it divide the
republic. He states,
Within the space of over three hundred years, the
differences between these parties caused but very few exiles,
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and cost still less blood; they cannot therefore be regarded
as having been very injurious and fatal to a republic.103
Machiavelli also emphasizes that the tumults were not detrimental to virtue in Rome.
Rather, he explains that “good examples [of virtue] arise from good education, good
education from good laws, and good laws from the very tumults”104 in question. Thus,
while Machiavelli holds the diverse humors of the Senate and plebs to be irreconcilable,
he understands the discord between them as a positive force. According to his headings for
chapters three and four of Book I, Machiavelli asserts that the tension between the Senate
and the plebs “caused the creation of the tribunes of the plebs in Rome, which made the
republic more perfect,”105 and that it also “made that republic free and powerful.”106
However, while Machiavelli promises to go through the events that led to the creation of
the tribunes, and thereby secured Rome’s liberty and power, he fails to do so. At this
point, therefore, I will turn to Livy and detail the tumults to which Machiavelli is
referring.
In Book II, Chapter 23 of the History of Rome, Livy states that “the patricians and
the plebeians were bitterly hostile to one another.”107 He explains that this was largely
because of the poor conditions of the debtors. Livy shares the story of one debtor, a
soldier-turned-slave, who appears before the Forum. He is described as corpse-like,
emaciated, and nearly savage in appearance. According to Livy, upon seeing this man and
hearing his story, “a great outcry arose; the excitement was not confined to the Forum, it
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spread everywhere throughout the City,”108 and the plebeians actively revolted against the
nobility. Livy states, “civic discord rent the State in twain.”109 Livy details another tumult
in chapter 28. He explains that in this episode the Senate passed a levy calling the plebs to
active service. However,
After dismissing the senate, the consuls ascended the
tribunal and called out the names of those liable to active
service. Not a single man answered to his name. The
people, standing round as though in formal assembly,
declared that the plebs could no longer be imposed upon,
the consuls should not get a single soldier until the promise
made in the name of the State was fulfilled. Before arms
were put into their hands, every man's liberty must be
restored to him, that they might fight for their country and
their fellow-citizens and not for tyrannical masters.

The Senate refused this request, and demanded the consuls to enforce the levy. As the
consuls attempted to do so, a fight erupted between the Senators and the plebians. Livy is
careful to note that “there had, however, been no stones thrown or weapons used, it had
resulted in more noise and angry words than personal injury.”110 In response to this
episode, the Senate created a Dictator to rule over the plebs. But a “man of moderate
temper”, who was not feared by the plebs, M. Valerius, was appointed as Dictator.
Ultimately, Valerius resigned the Dictatorship out of frustration with how the Senate
continued to treat the plebs and how it navigated the conflicts between the warring
factions.
As wars were waged, the contests between the patricians and the plebs continued
within Rome. Livy remarks, “the course which domestic affairs were taking continued to
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be a source of anxiety to both the patricians and the plebeians.”111 Eventually, when the
discord intensified even more greatly, a large number of plebeians withdrew from the city
to the Sacred Mount about three miles away. At this point,
A great panic seized the City, mutual distrust led to a state
of universal suspense. Those plebeians who had been left
by their comrades in the City feared violence from the
patricians; the patricians feared the plebeians who still
remained in the City, and could not make up their minds
whether they would rather have them go or stay. "How
long," it was asked, "would the multitude who had seceded
remain quiet? What would happen if a foreign war broke
out in the meantime?" They felt that all their hopes rested
on concord amongst the citizens, and that this must be
restored at any cost.112
And as a result, the Senate sent Menenius Agrippa, who was of plebeian origin, to make
amends. Livy explains that Agrippa won over the plebeians by describing a fable of the
parts of the body warring against each other as a metaphor for the discord between the
Senate and the plebs. In the negotiations for reconciliation that followed, “an agreement
was arrived at, the terms being that the plebs should have its own magistrates, whose
persons were to be inviolable, and who should have the right of affording protection
against the consuls. And further, no patrician should be allowed to hold that office.”113
Herein the tribunes were created.
Having charted the events that Machiavelli fails to describe, we can turn to his
assertions about their importance. As stated above, Machiavelli asserts that the tension
between the Senate and the plebs “caused the creation of the tribunes of the plebs in
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Rome, which made the republic more perfect.”114 He adds that it also “made that republic
free and powerful.”115 The following paragraphs will examine these claims.
At the end of chapter 3 of Book I of the Discourses, Machiavelli states that the
“the troubles of Rome,” (speaking of the discord between the Senate and the plebs,)
“occasioned the creation of the Tribunes.”116 In turn, the Tribunes “formed a powerful
barrier between the Senate and the people, which curbed the insolence of the former.”117
Thus, the Tribunes provided a formal system to effectively control and maintain the
discord between these two groups; they functioned as a check on the nobles’ power, and
prevented their abuse of the people. But furthermore, the creation of the Tribunes also
constituted Rome as a properly mixed regime, introducing a “popular” or “democratic”
element of government to the “monarchical” and “aristocratic” institutions that had been
in place. As such, Rome became what “sagacious legislators” have determined to be “most
stable and solid.”118 Therefore, it was through the discord between the Senate and the
plebs that “a combination was formed of the three powers, which rendered the constitution
perfect.”119
The next major benefit that Machiavelli identifies as a product of the tension
between the Senate and the plebs is that “all the laws that are favorable to liberty result
from the opposition of these parties to each other, as may easily be seen from the events
that occurred in Rome.”120 By making this point, Machiavelli extends his commentary on
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the creation of the tribunes. As was made clear above, for Machiavelli, the disunion
between the Senate and the plebs, as described in the events chronicled by Livy, was the
precise cause for the creation of the Tribunes. But these events also afforded “the people
the opportunity of giving vent, so to say, their ambition.”121 And the tribunes, once
created, still provided the people with an institution through which to “vent.” Machiavelli
says of the tribunes, “they cannot be praised too highly; for besides giving to the people a
share in the public administration, these Tribunes were established as the most assured
guardians of Roman liberty.”122 Machiavelli does not see the people’s “venting” as
detrimental, but instead holds that it guarded liberty in Rome, because he trusts the people,
more than the nobles, to best safeguard liberty. This is evident when he states, “the
demands of a free people are rarely pernicious to their liberty; they are generally inspired
by oppressions, experienced or apprehended.”123
However, Machiavelli does eventually accept the quarrels between the people and
Senate of Rome as “the cause of [its] loss of liberty,”124 and inquires whether Rome could
have employed a system based on unity as had existed in Sparta and Venice. In assessing
this question, Machiavelli concludes that because both Sparta and Venice were generally
small enough in number and did not welcome newcomers into government they were able
to preserve their systems of government and enjoy unity. Machiavelli determines that for
Rome to have accomplished this it would not have been able “to employ the people in the
armies, like the Venetians, or…open the doors to strangers, as had been the case in
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Sparta.”125 Rome, however, took the opposite path. As a result, Rome vested more power
with the people, and invited contest and turbulence. Despite this, however, Machiavelli
asserts that
had [Rome] been more tranquil, it would necessarily have
resulted that she would have been more feeble, and that she
would have lost with her energy also the ability of
achieving that high degree of greatness to which she
attained.126
For Machiavelli, when tension between factions is absent, political systems will be
characterized by stagnation, or will be susceptible to decay; they will be characterized by
weakness, rather than power. Moreover, although Machiavelli does acquiesce in the idea
that the hypothetically best political existence for a State is one that is peaceful within
and without, and marked by equilibrium and tranquility, he notes that such an existence is
impossible. Such an existence could only exist in a political vacuum, devoid of human
nature. For as he states at the end of Chapter VI –

As all human things are kept in a perpetual movement, and
can never remain stable, states naturally either rise or
decline, and necessity compels them to many acts to which
reason will not influence them…Seeing then the
impossibility of establishing in this respect a perfect
equilibrium, and that a precise middle course cannot be
maintained…I believe it therefore necessary rather to take
the constitution of Rome as a model than that of any other
republic, and to tolerate the differences that will arise
between the Senate and the people as an inconvenient
necessity in achieving greatness like that of Rome.127
In his extensive work, The Machiavellian Moment, JGA Pocock comments that
Machiavelli’s appreciation of tension is “shocking and incredible to minds which
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identified union with stability and virtue, conflict with innovation and decay.”128 But
Machiavelli’s “appreciation” becomes less shocking after considering that Rome’s
conflict allowed it to create the great empire, which has long since characterized, and
which ultimately destroyed, the republic. In sum, in asserting that the conflict between
the Senate and plebs created the tribunes, thus protecting Rome’s liberty and sustaining
its power, Machiavelli holds that “good effects of good order can come from apparent
disorder.”129
Having explained how Machiavelli identifies conflict as positive, it is useful to
note that not all conflict is good in Machiavelli’s eyes. While he accepts, even applauds,
“inevitable and productive conflict,” like that existing between the Senate and the plebs,
he condemns other conflicts. For instance, as Bock, Skinner, and Viroli point out, in the
Florentine Histories, “Machiavelli seems to have abandoned this positive evaluation of
civil conflict.”130 This complicates an understanding of Machiavelli as a proponent of
tension in politics. Examining the conflicts that he detests, however, we can begin to
reconcile these claims that appear to conflict. First, Machiavelli condemns conflict like
that “between rival families,” which he experienced in Florence.131 In “Civil discord in
Machiavelli’s Istorie Fiorentine,” Geneva Bock points out that, for Machiavelli, types of
discord like that arising between the Senate and the plebs of Rome is “natural,
unavoidable and may even lead, if checked and handled in a civilized way, to equality
and the common good.”132 Other types of discord, like conflict between competing
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political families, “are merely struggles for power, are avoidable and hence should be
avoided.”133 Bock quotes Machiavelli’s Florentine Histories, in which he argues against
divisions of “sette [sects, factions] and partisans,” for example divisions between
families, clans, client groups, and patronage systems.134
It seems that there are two principle factors that distinguish these two types of
tension. First, inevitability – tension that is inevitable cannot be avoided, and therefore
must be controlled and put to good use. It seems an inherent aspect of political society
and therefore of history. And while it had its defects, it also has its rewards. The second
factor, relating to the resolution of conflict, seems to be the presence of an institutional
system that can house or accommodate tension. The tension existing between the Senate
and the plebs was institutionalized within the Roman government through the creation of
the tribunes. Therefore, while conflicts still arose between the noble and popular classes,
they raged on within the confines of the political apparatus and the “quarrels between the
nobles and the people in Rome were settled by discussions.”135 As such, the disunion
between the Senate and the plebs did not threaten the political apparatus itself. In
Florence, on the other hand, conflict ended in violence; it was not directed through formal
political channels, through which its passions could have been put to good use. As a
result, it threatened the political system itself.
The pages above have fleshed out how Machiavelli introduces tension as an
inevitable aspect of the political, and defends its usefulness to a republic. The chapter will
now turn to address the question of where Machiavelli sits in relation to agonal theory.
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Modern political theorists, Leo Strauss for example, have highlighted the originality of
Machiavelli’s position in the Discourses; Strauss labels it as a “wholly new praise of
discord.”136 And under the entry for “Machiavelli” in the International Encyclopedia of
Political Science, his vision of social institutions, “which suggests that popular discord
makes society free and powerful,” is described as “agonistic” and “dynamic.”137
Machiavelli is also regularly referenced in the work of agonal theorists. He is
cited by Chantal Mouffe as the “first to recognize” an understanding of the political as
“collective participation in a public sphere where interests are confronted, conflicts
resolved, divisions exposed, confrontations staged, and in that way, liberty secured.”138
Similarly, Mark Wenman, in his book Agonistic Democracy, notes, “indeed, we can trace
the first explicit formulation in western political thought of the agonistic idea of the
positive value of conflict to Machiavelli’s The Discourses, where he developed the idea
that internal conflict can contribute to the vitality of the republic.”139As such, Machiavelli
seems to emerge as a forefather of the agonal tradition.
While the previous chapter pointed to agonism’s origins in the Greek agon and
noted an appreciation of tension in Roman Stoicism, this section seeks to underscore the
fact that Machiavelli puts forth the first explicit, formal agonal political perspective.
Machiavelli’s appreciation of tension, however, does not solely appear in the work of
modern agonal theorists. Rather, Machiavelli’s thoughts on tension as inevitable, and
potentially positive, appear at various moments in the work of a number of modern
political theorists who came after him. Therefore, this study will now turn to identifying
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some of the other examples of an appreciation on tension within modern Western
political thought, including moments of appreciation in the work of Montesquieu,
Edmund Burke, J.S. Mill, and Alexis de Tocqueville, after which it will note a few
moments of opposition.
Montesquieu
First turning to the eighteenth century French political philosopher, we see that
Montesquieu follows Machiavelli in displaying an appreciation of tension in his political
thought. Scholars have remarked that Montesquieu was profoundly influenced by
Machiavelli.140 This is apparent in Montesquieu’s remarks in Considerations on
Greatness of the Romans and their Decline, especially his discussion on the dissensions
of Rome. He states,
We hear in the authors only of the dissensions that ruined
Rome, without seeing that these dissensions were necessary
to it, that they had always been there and always had to be.
It was the greatness of the republic that caused all the
trouble and changed popular tumults into civil wars. There
had to be dissensions in Rome, for warriors who were so
proud, so audacious, so terrible abroad could not be very
moderate at home. To ask for men in a free state who are
bold in war and timid in peace is to wish the impossible.
And, as a general rule, whenever we see everyone tranquil
in a state that calls itself a republic, we can be sure that
liberty does not exist there.141
Here we see Montesquieu not only accepting the conflict between the Senate and the
plebs as inevitable, but also, just like Machiavelli, regarding it as necessary and
defending it as the source of Rome’s liberty. This, Montesquieu believed, applied outside
the case of Rome. As F.T.H. Fletcher writes in Montesquieu and English Politics,
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“political divisions were not merely salutary, but necessary in a free state.”142 Though
political divisions may bring about conflict and agitation, they are still desirable because,
as Montesquieu explains in Spirit of the Laws, tranquility signifies despotism. He states,
“as fear is the principle of despotic government, its end is tranquility; but this tranquility
cannot be called a peace: no it is only the silence of those towns which the enemy is
ready to invade.”143 A free society, on the other hand, will be marked by “all the passions
being unrestrained, hatred, envy, jealousy and an ambition desire of riches and
honors.”144 But as Montesquieu observes, “were it otherwise, the state would be in the
condition of a man weakened by sickness, who is without passions because he is without
strength.”145
Montesquieu’s appreciation of conflict in politics seems to become complicated,
however, in his lessons on the separation of powers. On the one hand, Montesquieu
claims that power can only be checked by competing power. He makes this perfectly
clear in Chapter XI, 4 of Spirit of the Laws, when he states, “it is necessary from the very
nature of things that power should be a check to power.” Constitutions, according to
Montesquieu, should be designed with this in mind – hence the separation of powers.
Moreover, as Franz Neumann describes in his introduction to Montesquieu’s Spirit of the
Laws, Montesquieu understood that different social groups or interests would
characterize each of the powers. To Montesquieu, “the monarch…represented social
interests different from those of the legislature; the legislature…was to represent the
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aristocracy and the bourgeoisie respectively; while the judiciary…was to represent
everybody, and hence nobody.”146 With this arrangement, it would be expected that each
power would have a very different prerogative. However, Montesquieu states in Book XI,
chapter 6, “these three powers should naturally form a state of repose or inaction. But as
there is a necessity for movement in the course of human affairs, they are forced to move,
but still in concert.”147 Herein, it seems that the separate powers must agree, which is
inconsistent with his appreciations of conflict and tension that were outlined above.
There is an interpretation, however, which uncovers a sense of consistency
throughout his thought. Perhaps what Montesquieu means by “moving in concert” is
similar to his discussion in Considerations on “dissonance” and “harmony” as they relate
to unity.148 In Considerations, following his contention that dissention was not the cause
of Rome’s downfall, Montesquieu says,
What is called union in a body politic is a very equivocal
thing. The true kind is a union of harmony, whereby all the
parts, however opposed they may appear, cooperate for the
general good of society — as dissonances in music
cooperate in producing overall concord. In a state where we
seem to see nothing but commotion there can be union —
that is, a harmony resulting in happiness, which alone is
true peace.149
What Montesquieu seems to be describing is what we previously observed Mouffe
describe as agonism. Surely there is conflict, tension, disagreement, and debate in
politics. However, it is a debate between adversaries, not enemies. Opposition operates
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within an agreed upon institutional framework, and all opposition operates in the name of
the good. Ultimately this produces some sort of unity. But, just as Mouffe expounds, it is
unity in “a context of conflict and diversity.”150 Moreover, Montesquieu offers this
dissonant concord in contrast to what he calls “the concord of Asiatic despotism,” in
which he argues, “there is always real dissension...if we see any union there, it is not
citizens who are united but dead bodies buried one next to the other.”151 Herein, perhaps
what Montesquieu meant by “moving in concert,” is not that the powers must always
necessarily be in perfect "unison,” but rather that, despite their differences, they must
exist under agreed-upon institutions and work towards the general good of society. In
doing this, any dissonances between them will augment the harmony of society, rather
than threaten it. Such an interpretation allows one to discern a much more consistent,
comprehensive appreciation of tension throughout Montesquieu’s political thought.
Burke
Irish born, eighteenth century British politician, Edmund Burke also appears to
accept tension as inevitable in, and ultimately positive for politics in his appreciation of
parties. Harvey Mansfield, in his work Statesmanship and Party Government, shares that
in 1769 Burke commented that “party divisions are inseparable from free government.”152
In this vein, Burke appears to acknowledge division and conflict between these groups as
an inevitable fact of political society, and supports their subsequent placement in
institutions of government. Burke’s recognition of division and conflict as inevitable goes
further – for Burke, opposition was tolerable, even desirable. Parties, according to Burke,
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are bodies of men united “for promoting by their joint endeavors the national interest,
upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed.”153 In working to advance
their particular conception of the good, however, parties exist in rivalry with one another.
Burke expresses an acceptance of such party division and rivalry. He remarks that parties
are “on the whole operating for good.”154 Because parties are accepted within institutions
of government, what Burke seems to be introducing is an idea of regulated rivalry. As
explained by Nancy Rosenblum in On the Side of the Angels, “regulated rivalry simply
says that parties can serve this basic good of nonviolent, institutionalized conflict and
political change.”155
Burke is especially appreciative of partisan discord in cases when the power of
one group needs to be checked or curtailed. For Burke, the best way to prevent one
corrupt, power-seeking group was to establish other groups in opposition. This lies
behind his comment in “Thoughts,” which states, “when bad men combine, the good men
must associate; else they will fall one by one, an unpitied sacrifice in a contemptible
struggle.”156 For Burke, this is essential to maintain liberty. As John Plamenatz writes in
his review of Burke’s “Thoughts” in a 1951 issue of Parliamentary Affairs,157 for Burke,
“if freedom is to survive, there must, wherever there are parties, be more than one party,
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and that they must, since it is their nature to strive for power, be always competing for it
and yet never able to put an end to the competition.”158
Burke’s praise of tension and conflict seems to go even further than his
appreciation of partisan conflict. Burke also appreciates tension and conflict within
government institutions themselves. In discussing the separation of powers in
government, Burke puts forward the idea that “the common good emerges as the result of
the interaction, perhaps the competition, of the parts of government and society.”159 As
such, he expounds the idea that conflict and debate, rather than unity and consensus,
between institutions of government may procure good effects for political society.
Mill
Nineteenth century Englishman John Stuart Mill also exhibits an appreciation of
conflict and debate in his political thought. Primarily in his essay On Liberty, Mill
suggests that dissent can be advantageous despite its dangers or unorthodox nature.160
First, Mill puts forward that conflicts of opinion and debate are useful on the individual
level. To Mill, rational opinion and conduct only come to fruition through conflict and
debate. In his work Government by Dissent, Robert Martin outlines Mill’s thoughts on
the value of dissent on the individual level. He points out that Mill believes that
dissenters’ views are “on balance, productive because they make the rest of us reevaluate
our own views, making what would otherwise be “dead dogma” into “living truth.””161
Mill expresses this with his discussion of those who are wise. The wise, according to
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Mill, have become wise because they accept and consider the criticism and feedback of
other opinions. He states, “in the case of any person whose judgment is really deserving
of confidence, how has it become so? Because he has kept his mind open to criticism of
his opinions and conduct. Because it has been his practice to listen to all that could be
said against him.”162
Mill extends this appreciation of conflict and debate past the individual level,
extending it to politics generally. For Mill, in the political realm, “only through diversity
of opinion is there…a chance of fair-play to all sides of the truth.”163 Moreover, and
perhaps more importantly, Mill appreciates politics as the art of balancing opposing sides
(as represented through parties) and maintaining a tradition of conflict. Such a tradition
will prevent any one side, party, or perspective from growing too strong, which is vital
for the health of the state. He writes,
In politics, again, it is almost a commonplace that a party of
order or stability, and a party of progress or reform, are
both necessary elements of a healthy state of political
life…Each of these modes of thinking derives its utility
from the deficiencies of the other; but it is in a great
measure the opposition of the other that keeps each within
the limits of reason and sanity. Unless opinions favourable
to democracy and to aristocracy, to property and to
equality, to co-operation and to competition, to luxury and
to abstinence, to sociality and individuality, to liberty and
discipline, and all the other standing antagonisms of
practical life, are expressed with equal freedom, and
enforced and defended with equal talent and energy, there
is no chance of both elements obtaining their due; one scale
is sure to go up and the other down.164
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Mill remarks that maintaining a balanced tension between opposites is challenging, but,
as emphasized above, necessary for the sake of “reason” and “sanity,” not to mention
freedom. Herein, Mill clearly appreciates conflict as an expedient political reality, and
defends the maintenance of a balanced tension through dissention and debate amongst
competing parties or viewpoints.

Tocqueville
Turning to the nineteenth century, French political thinker and historian, Alexis
de Tocqueville showcases an appreciation of tension in his thought. As stated by Eric
Plaag in his introduction to a translation of Democracy in America, “Tocqueville’s
Democracy remains a masterful display of insight and foresight into all things American.
Coming from a twenty-six year-old tourist, his observations seem to display nothing short
of pure genius.”165 Similarly, in their introduction to Democracy in America, Harvey
Mansfield and Delba Winthrop remark, “Democracy in America is at once the best book
ever written on democracy and the best book ever written on America.”166 This argument,
while undeniably bold, highlights the particular usefulness of Alexis de Tocqueville to
this chapter. Democracy in America’s contents and contribution to political science
extend far beyond an acute analysis of the American political system; the work provides
an equally acute analysis of democratic government generally. Tocqueville states in his
own introduction, “I confess that, in America, I saw more than America; I sought there
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the image of democracy itself, with its inclinations, its character its prejudices, and its
passions, in order to learn what we have to fear or to hope from its progress.”167
While much of Tocqueville’s commentary on democracy has been studied
extensively, one of his significant contributions seems to have received less attention –
the role of tension in liberal democratic politics. It is this, often overlooked, contribution
that this study is most concerned with. Throughout Tocqueville’s work in Democracy in
America, one can identify tension’s role in politics as it plays out in broader democratic
theory, and then focus in more narrowly, examining how tension fits into American
democracy specifically. The latter examination is one the next chapter will undertake.
Tocqueville accommodates more than one single tension within his political
theory, but the principle tension that he discusses is that which exists between equality
and liberty. Tocqueville opens Democracy in America by establishing an equality of
conditions as the fundamental fact of American democracy. But he pushes this further,
claiming that there is a worldwide trend towards such an equality of conditions and
towards democratic institutions as well. For Tocqueville, this social phenomenon has
political implications; after all, “it is impossible to believe that equality will not
eventually find its way to the political world, as it does everywhere else.”168 Just as men
are socially equal, they are to be politically equal as well. As such, Tocqueville identifies
equality as the idol of democratic nations. He remarks, “nothing can satisfy them without
equality, and they would rather perish than lose it.”169 Tocqueville points out, however,
that while equality may be democratic nations’ first love, it is hardly their only. “On the
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contrary, they have an instinctive love of [liberty].”170 But liberty, or as Tocqueville often
refers to it, freedom, is a principle value of democracy, it is not “the distinguishing
characteristic of democratic ages.”171
According to Tocqueville, democracy is best maintained when equality and
liberty are properly balanced. In part II, chapter 1, of the second volume of Democracy
in America Tocqueville remarks,
It is possible to imagine an extreme point at which freedom
and equality would meet and be confounded together. Let us
suppose that all the members of the community take a part
in the government, and that each of them has an equal right
to take a part in it. As none is different from his fellows,
none can exercise a tyrannical power: men will be
completely free, because they are entirely equal; and they
will all be perfectly equal, because they are entirely free. To
this ideal state democratic nations tend.172
But he continues,
Equality, pushed to its furthest extent, may be confounded
with freedom, yet there is good reason for distinguishing
the one from the other. The taste which men have for
liberty, and that which they feel for equality, are, in fact,
two different things.173
As Tocqueville sees it, equality and liberty do not always lend themselves to one
another. Rather, “equality awakens in men several propensities extremely dangerous to
freedom.”174 First, Tocqueville comments that equality leads those within a democracy
to have contempt for “forms.” To those focused on equality, forms – comparable to
modern social norms or manners – reak of aristocracy. However, Tocqueville argues that
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forms are essential to freedom. Forms perpetually serve as a retardant, a sedative.
According to Tocqueville, this “is the very thing which renders forms so useful to
freedom: for their chief merit is to serve as a barrier between the strong and the weak, the
ruler and the people, to retard the one, and give the other time to look about him.”175
Second, Tocqueville asserts that in their commitment to equality, a democratic people
will often undervalue the rights of private persons. He states that because they are
relatively new rights, and, historically, have not been significant, “the rights of private
persons amongst democratic nations are… often sacrificed without regret, and almost
always violated without remorse.”176 Cumulatively, his warnings echo a statement he
makes in Volume I of Democracy in America, in which he observes, “in a state where the
citizens are all nearly equal, it becomes difficult for them to preserve their independence
against the aggressions of power. No one among them being strong enough to engage in
the struggle alone with advantage, nothing but a general combination can protect their
liberty.”177 Herein, achieving universal equality can, at times, directly threaten liberty.
When this happens, a substantial, unified effort would be required to safeguard liberty.
But, as Tocqueville points out, “such a union is not always possible.”178 And although
Tocqueville does not take the same care to explore how liberty may infringe upon
equality, one can imagine several instances in which this may happen. Thus, for
Tocqueville, properly constituted democracy is conflicted at its core.
The paradox between equality and liberty is not, however, Tocqueville’s primary
fear for democracy. Rather, Tocqueville’s principal concern is that in attempting to
175
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resolve this tension in favor of equality, democratic nations will descend into despotism.
Specifically, Tocqueville fears what he calls a “soft despotism.” In contrast to his
depiction of a ‘healthy democracy’, characterized by action and contest, Tocqueville
paints despotism as a relatively tranquil political state. As Paul Rahe examines in Soft
Despotism, Democracy’s Drift, the despotism that Tocqueville anticipates “would be
more extensive and gentler or softer, and it would degrade men without tormenting
them.”179 Tocqueville’s in-depth description of such despotism is as follows –
an innumerable multitude of men, all equal and alike, incessantly
endeavoring to procure the petty and paltry pleasures with which they glut
their lives. Each of them, living apart, is a stranger to the fate of all the rest
– his children and his private friends constitute to him the whole of
mankind; as for the as for the rest of his fellow-citizens…he exists but in
himself and for himself alone; and if his kindred still remain to him, he
may be said at any rate to have lost his country. Above him stands an
immense and tutelary power, which takes upon itself alone to secure their
gratifications, and to watch over their fate, that power is absolute, minute,
regular, provident, and mild…it seeks…to keep them in perpetual
childhood; it is well content that the people should rejoice, provided they
think of nothing but rejoicing. For their happiness such a government
labors, but it chooses to be the sole agent and the only arbiter of that
happiness: it provides for their security, foresees and supplies their
necessities, facilitates their pleasures, manages their principal concerns,
directs their industry, regulates the descent of property, and subdivides
their inheritances: what remains, but to spare them all the care of thinking
and all the trouble of living? Thus, it everyday renders the exercise of the
free agency of man less and less frequent; it circumscribes the will within
a narrower range, and gradually robs a man of all the uses of himself. The
principle of equality has prepared men for these things; it has predisposed
men to endure them, and oftentimes to look on them as benefits. After
having thus successively taken each member of the community in its
powerful grasp, and fashioned him at will, the supreme power then
extends its arm over the whole community. It covers the surface of society
with a network of small complicated rules, minute and uniform, through
which the most original minds and the most energetic characters cannot
penetrate, to rise above the crowd. The will of man is not shattered, but
softened, bent, and guided; men are seldom forced by it to act, but they are
constantly restrained from acting: such a power does not destroy, but it
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prevents existence; it does not tyrannize, but it compresses; enervates,
extinguishes, and stupefies a people, till each nation is reduced to be
nothing better than a flock of timid and industrious animals, of which the
government is the shepherd. 180
Ultimately, Tocqueville finds that such a despotism “often promises to make
amends for a thousand previous ills; it supports the right, it protects the oppressed, and it
maintains public order. The nation is lulled by the temporary prosperity which it
produced.”181 On the other hand, the maintenance of a balanced tension between equality
and liberty is generally established with difficulty in the midst of storms; it is perfected
by civil discord.”182 Therefore, a balanced relationship between equality and liberty is not
easily achieved or maintained; it will not be comfortable or smooth. However,
Tocqueville’s description of “soft despotism” emphasizes that even more dangerous than
the perils of conflicts between equality and liberty, is the irradiation of the tension
between these two principles of democracy. Tocqueville hopes that democratic nations
can procure and maintain a balance between these two, at times contradictory, political
tenets. As Aurelian Craiutu points out in his article, “Tocqueville’s Paradoxical
Moderation,” “Tocqueville believed that democracy is inherently unstable and dangerous
not so much because it is predicated on a constant tension between equality and liberty
but because most people would seek to solve this tension in favor of equality by
abandoning liberty.”183
The following comments were also put forward in the previous chapter, but they
are worth mentioning again: Tocqueville’s discussion on equality and liberty and Chantal
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Mouffe’s “democratic paradox” are strikingly similar. Indeed, it seems very odd that
Mouffe does not quote, or even cite, Tocqueville once. After all, Tocqueville really
seems to present the exact idea that Mouffe argues for in The Democratic Paradox: that
liberal-democracy is not “the search for an inaccessible consensus, but an agonistic
confrontation of the constitutive liberal-democratic values”184 – i.e., equality and liberty.
Having fleshed out Tocqueville’s thoughts on the relationship between equality
and liberty in democracy, it is clear that Tocqueville saw the utility of tension for politics,
and seems to incorporate an aspect of agonal theory in his democratic thought. His
accommodation of tension, however, is not limited to the relationship between equality
and liberty. Tocqueville also saw tension’s benefits for democracy in the conflicts arising
from pluralism, namely in its ability to protect against the tyranny of the majority. As
mentioned in the previous chapter, in The Return of the Political, Chantal Mouffe states,
“a healthy democratic process calls for a vibrant clash of political positions and the open
conflict of interests.”185 The following paragraphs will emphasize that Tocqueville would
have been inclined to agree.
First, Tocqueville regards conflicting interests as inevitable in great democratic
nations. Democracy facilitates the existence of a wide-array of political opinions and
perspectives. Moreover, Tocqueville acknowledged the propensity for people to join
together with like-minded individuals. In the process of associating, the shared opinions
that brought people together in the first place will often intensify and a sort of crowd
effect seems to be in place –
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the intensity of human passions is heightened not only by
the importance of the end which they propose to attain, but
by the multitude of individuals who are animated by them,
at the same time. Everyone has had occasion to remark, that
his emotions in the midst of a sympathizing crowd are far
greater than those which he would have felt in solitude.186
People are inclined to associate with those who profess the same opinion. And as
democracy tolerates and breeds a multiplicity of political opinions, it will accept and
encourage an abundance of political associations. Tocqueville defines an association as a
“public assent which a number of individuals give to certain doctrines; and in the
engagement which they contract to promote in a certain manner the spread of those
doctrines.”187 Associations are useful political tools as they unite and focus the efforts of
individuals, helping them to achieve an end which they mutually desire.
The unlimited right to association, however, has consequences, namely that
conflicting and competing associations will inevitably arise. In a free country with an
open right of association, “all is bustle and activity…amelioration and progress are the
topics of inquiry.”188 And while Tocqueville recognizes the convulsions that this will
produce, he accepts them as necessary for the maintenance of democracy. Tocqueville
asserts that fierce opposition among political associations “has become a necessary
guaranty against the tyranny of the majority.”189 Therefore, while the tension existing
between political associations, at worst, threatens to “throw [a] nation into anarchy,” or at
least “perpetually augments the chances of that calamity,”190 it is integral for the health of
democratic government. Tocqueville comments, “a dangerous expedient is used to
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obviate a still more formidable danger,” that danger being the despotism of a faction or
solitary ruler.191 As Craiutu points out, “Tocqueville realized that if any one set of
interests at work in society were ever allowed to reign absolutely over its rivals, the
competition between them would come to an end and society would be deprived of one
of its leading principles of social improvement.”192 It is the tension between competing
interests that allows for the advancement of democratic society. Craiutu summarizes
Tocqueville’s point well:
Social and moral progress would become impossible,
because society would lack the necessary pluralism that
makes political freedom possible…in order to survive and
flourish, democratic societies must cultivate a systematic
antagonism by creating the necessary conditions for a free
competition for power between rival ideas, principles,
forces, modes of life, and interests.193
Exploring his commentary on the relationship between equality and liberty, as
well as his defense of pluralism, it becomes obvious that Tocqueville admires, or at least
respects, the inevitable presence and, moreover, the potential usefulness of tension within
democracies. Towards the end of his chapter in Volume I of Democracy in America
entitled, “Advantages of Democracy,” he admits the disadvantages that democracy may
incur because of its paradoxical, conflict-ridden, existence. Tocqueville states,
“Democratic liberty is far from accomplishing all its projects with the skill of an adroit
despotism. It frequently abandons them before they have home their fruits, or risks them
when the consequences may be dangerous.”194 But he justifies this:
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in the end, it produces more than any absolute
government…[Democracy] produces what the ablest
governments are frequently unable to create; namely, an
all-pervading and restless activity, a superabundant force,
and an energy which is inseparable from it, and which may,
however unfavorable circumstances may be, produce
wonders.195
Finally, Tocqueville’s appreciation of conflict and tension is evident in his ideas
on moderation. Tocqueville rejects any benefits of moderation characterized by
mass floating in the middle, inert, egotistic, without energy
without patriotism, sensual, sybaritic, that has only
instincts, that lives from day to day, that becomes in turn
the plaything of all the others. Moderation without virtue
nor courage; moderation that is born from cowardice of the
heart and not from virtue, from exhaustion, from fear, from
egoism; tranquility that does not come about because you
are well-off, but because you do not have the courage and
the energy necessary to seek something better. Debasement
of souls. The passions of old men that end in impotence.196
Here we see that moderation, for Tocqueville, should be avoided, unless it is an
immoderate moderation, characterized by paradox and contradiction, like the moderation
he himself seems to exhibit. Throughout his political thought, as detailed by Craiutu,
“Tocqueville speaks…without offering a rigid doctrine.”197 In fact, Tocqueville’s thought
seems, at times, inconsistent, even contradictory. Craiutu continues, “On one hand he is
liberal, on another conservative. He seems to adore democracy, but occasionally he
ardently defends aristocracy. Even for those who find him to be moderate, his moderation
is found to immoderately composed.”198 Thus, as Craiutu has aptly pointed out, it seems
that Tocqueville himself heeded the advice he gave to democracies; his work and his
political thought exhibit the same sorts of tension, conflict, even paradox, that he
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identifies in democracy. Herein, if one identifies Tocqueville as a “moderate,” they must
accept him as an agonistic one.
To summarize, Tocqueville’s comments on the paradoxical relationship between
equality and liberty, on the need for a multiplicity of opinions, and on moderation all
emphasize how he accommodates and incorporates tension and conflict in his political
thought. In this vein, he follows Machiavelli, Montesquieu, Burke, and Mill in exhibiting
some of the central tenets of modern agonal theory in his political thought.
While each of the last five examples have emphasized the pervasiveness of the
characteristic elements of agonal theory within and throughout modern political thought,
there are also moments of significant opposition to agonal ideas in the work of other
modern political thinkers. Therefore, while the task of this chapter is to note how the
principles of agonal theory are appreciated throughout modern political thought, it is
important to observe that such an appreciation is not universal. There are a number of
modern theorists who do not accommodate, much less appreciate, notions of conflict or
tension within their political thought, as the following paragraphs on Thomas Hobbes, J.J.
Rousseau, and Woodrow Wilson will show.
Hobbes
The work of seventeenth century English political philosopher, Thomas Hobbes,
clearly marks a moment of opposition to agonal ideas in modern political thought.
Hobbes explicitly rejects pluralism and, therefore, any positive conception of tension as
well. In his famous Leviathan, Hobbes constructs an absolutely powerful sovereign. This
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sovereign is created when men join the social contract, conferring “all of their power and
strength upon one man”199 to escape the State of Nature. The resulting sovereign is “one
person, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants one with another, have
made themselves every one the author, to the end he may use the strength and means of
them all, as he shall think expedient, for their peace and common defense.”200 Once it is
established through the social contract, this Leviathan, according to Hobbes, exists to
preserve the commonwealth by preventing civil disunion and opposition, which he sees
as likely to produce civil war. The absolute sovereign will “defend [men] from … the
injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort as… they may nourish
themselves and live contentedly.”201 Herein, Hobbes creates his particular escape from
the state of nature precisely in an effort to avoid disunion and the conflict it precipitates.
Similarly, Hobbes rejects the viability of the separation of powers. In his chapter entitled
“Of Those Things that Weaken, or Tend to the Dissolution of a Commonwealth,” Hobbes
states, “what is it to divide the power of a Commonwealth, but to dissolve it; for powers
divided mutually destroy each other.”202 Therefore, Hobbes clearly rejects pluralism, and
rejects tension, including tension between powers of government, even more strongly. As
Rosenblum explains, “Hobbes’ is a theory of sovereign absolutism in the service of a
stable whole.”203 Hobbes does not accommodate any form of agonal theory in his
political philosophy and represents an obvious moment of opposition to agonism in
modern political thought.
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Rousseau
Writing in 18th century France, republican Jean-Jacques Rousseau also presents a
perspective that does not accommodate any sort of pluralism or tension. His work,
therefore, clearly opposes agonal ideas. First, Rousseau “opposed any political
recognition of parts.”204 For Rousseau, only the whole is sovereign. In A Discourse on the
Origins of Inequality, Rousseau makes a point of saying that authority is derived from
civil society, rather than the other way around. This idea, garnered on the notion of
consent, is furthered in his Social Contract. In joining the social contract each man freely
“unites himself with all” on the following terms -each of us puts his person and all his power in common
under the supreme direction of the general will, and, in our
corporate capacity we receive each member as an
indivisible part of the whole.205
We see here that Rousseau aimed his political theory at unity. Conversely, for Rousseau,
pluralism is an abomination. This is evident in book IV of The Social Contract, where
Rousseau states, “when particular interest begin to make themselves felt and sectional
societies begin to exert an influence…the common interest becomes corrupted.”206
Therefore, as Rosenblum points out in her analysis of Rousseau, “unanimity is not just an
ideal but the supreme premise of Rousseau’s republicanism.”207 In rejecting pluralism,
Rousseau inherently rejects tension. The general will does not accommodate competition
between opinions or interests. Instead, it singles out one singular, commonly held opinion
and pushes that forward, coercing all to support it in executing their commitment to the
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social contract. Rousseau’s twofold rejection of pluralism and tension highlights the fact
that his political theory is opposed to any notion of agonism.
Wilson
Finally, turning to a more contemporary example, American President Woodrow
Wilson provides an additional moment of opposition to agonal theory in modern political
thought. Wilson preaches an art of politics that discards the diversity of ideas and works
to unify the public towards one particular vision. In fact, Wilson rejects the
government’s, as well as the people’s, ability to accommodate tension. As such, he
objects to the thinking of the Founding Fathers. (As the next chapter will assert, the
Founding Father’s did accommodate, and actually appreciate, tension within their
political thought and fashioned the American polity with this in mind.) Wilson claims
that “the trouble with the [Federalist] theory is that government is not a machine, but a
living thing…accountable to Darwin, not to Newton…No living thing can have its organs
offset against each other as checks, and live.”208 Wilson’s progressivism, therefore,
attempted to function for unity, which he believed he could find by being concerned with
the “common” or “average” man. As W.J. Coats outlines in his chapter on Wilson in
Statesmanship,
what we can see, then, in the achievements of Woodrow
Wilson and the progressive movement, is the public
endorsement and codification of the incipient changes in
customs and manners (away from independent judgment)
described by Cooper in 1838: the citizen of the U.S.
democratic system is no longer to attempt to preserve the
internal tension which arises in weighing his needs against
those of the public authority and the common good.209
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Herein, Wilson seeks to take tension out of politics, emphasizing that Wilson exhibits
another moment of opposition to agonal ideas within modern political thought.
Conclusion
This chapter has detailed five moments of appreciation of agonal ideas from the
first formal appreciation of political tension, in the 16th century, in Machiavelli’s
Discourses on Livy, through his contemporaries, Montesquieu, Burke, Mill and
Tocqueville, along with three moments of opposition in the thought of Hobbes,
Rousseau, and President Woodrow Wilson. These efforts have emphasized that agonal
theory, though not universally accepted and expounded, can be identified within modern
Western political thought. From this point, this study will turn to its examination of one
final moment of appreciation.
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CHAPTER III
Agonistic Democracy in the United States of America
“America historically has achieved the ultimate stability of
an arch: those very forces which are logically calculated to
drag stones to the ground actually provide props of support
– derived from a principle in which thrust and counterthrust become means of counterpoise.”
–Michael Kammen, People of Paradox
Having explored agonism, defining it, discussing its origins, and highlighting both
the moments where its central ideas are tangible in the thought of mainstream modern
political theorists, as well as a few moments where they are criticized, this study now
turns to its final assertion – that conflict and tension lay at the heart of the American
polity. Pushing this point further, it will argue that the way in which the American system
accommodates, institutionalizes and appreciates tension, renders the American
experiment in democracy to be, more specifically, an experiment in agonistic democracy.
As a refresher, most basically, agonism is marked by two main tenets: first,
agonism acknowledges and accepts tension and conflict as inevitable facts of pluralist
society. Second, agonism defends this tension and conflict as necessary, even positive,
for the maintenance of democracy. This section will, therefore, take the time to defend
the view that pluralism, and the dissension and debate that arise from pluralism, are, and
historically have been, understood as inevitable to American democracy since its
founding. The chapter will then identify how tension has been institutionalized within,
and encouraged by, the American political system for the sake of maintaining popular
government in the United States, and, as such, how it manifests in the modern American
polity.
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As stated in the earlier chapter on agonism, I am defining pluralism most basically
to mean the existence, recognition, and toleration of unique, distinguishable parts that
exist within a political society. The statement that American democracy is a pluralist
democracy is something I’ve never had to defend. It has always been a given, something
stated, but never cited – a hallmark of American democracy. But, for the sake of this
project, I believe defending pluralism as an inherent aspect of American political society
is worthwhile.
Nancy Rosenblum, in On The Side Of The Angels, explains that under pluralism,
social and political parts are considered legitimate and are incorporated into the system of
government. “Pluralism is an admitted fact of social life.”210 Moreover, as was mentioned
in an earlier chapter, democratic forms of government permit and promote pluralism.
Chantal Mouffe states in The Democratic Paradox, “pluralism of interests and values
ha[s] to be acknowledged as coextensive with the very idea of ‘the people.’”211
Democracy, or government by “the people”, is characterized by such a pluralism of
interests and values, which manifest in a multitude of unique, distinguishable groups,
associations, and parts.
But American democracy, specifically, has acknowledged and accepted pluralism
as implicit to its form. Modern scholars are quick to note the pluralistic quality of
American society. In his book, People of Paradox, Michael Kammen argues, “unstable
pluralism on a scale of unprecedented proportion is especially American.”212 Truthfully,
one need look no further than the Seal of the United States or the tail-side of a new
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penny, where “E Pluribus Unum” is written, to see proof that pluralism is central to the
American polity. E Pluribus Unum means “out of many, one,” and represents the idea
that our one country is composed of many unique parts, that the American Union exists in
the context of pluralist society.
This acknowledgement and acceptance of pluralism can be easily traced back to
the founding of the nation. Turning to what is viewed as one of the most informative
authorities on the thought of the American founders, the Federalist Papers (and
Federalist 10 and Federalist 51, in particular), we see that that the Founding Fathers
viewed pluralism, and conflict as a result, to be inevitable truths of liberal democratic
politics, and thereby central to American society. In the famous Federalist 10, Madison
states, “as long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it,
different opinions will be formed…the diversity in the faculties of men…is not less an
insuperable obstacle to an uniformity of interests.”213 Madison recognizes that “a division
of the society into different interests and parties”214 is inevitable. It is inevitable because
it is inherent to mankind. Madison writes, “the latent causes of faction are thus sown in
the nature of man; and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of activity,
according to the different circumstances of civil society.”215 And in Federalist 51,
Madison identifies pluralism in the United States specifically. American society, he
states, “will be broken into so many parts, interests and classes of citizens.”216
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Having recognized pluralism as inherent to democratic society generally, and
American society specifically, the Founders understood that conflict, tension, and
dissension, will naturally follow. As Madison articulately outlines in Federalist 10,
A zeal for different opinions concerning religion,
concerning government, and many other points, as well of
speculation as of practice; an attachment to different
leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and
power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes
have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn,
divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual
animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex
and oppress each other than to co-operate for their common
good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into
mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion
presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions
have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and
excite their most violent conflicts.217
At this point, it takes little effort to recognize that James Madison, the father of the
American Constitution, has outlined the first tenants of agonal theory – that pluralism is
inherent to democratic political society and that conflict and tension will manifest
themselves within politics as a result.
The American political system that Madison and the other Founding Fathers
fashioned was designed with the fact of pluralism in mind. The Founders believed that
pluralism produced the “violent conflicts” and “unfriendly passions” of faction, but they
also believed that the causes of faction could not be removed. As Madison outlines,
faction could only be removed through two options. The first option would be to
extinguish liberty, as “liberty is to faction, what air is to fire, an aliment, without which it
instantly expires.”218 But as liberty is essential to political life in a democratic state, this
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is a nonviable option. The second recourse, to quell faction, would be to implement
uniformity. Madison explains this as “giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same
passions, and the same interests.”219 But he establishes this as virtually impossible, given
the aforementioned reality of pluralism. It was in this vein that the founders established
that “the causes of faction cannot be removed.”220
As such, in shaping the American polity, the Founders were concerned with
“controlling the effects”221—the conflict, tension, and dissention – of the faction that
results from pluralistic democracy, rather than removing them. While the Founding
Fathers recognized that the “violent conflicts” that faction produces might “clog the
administration” or “convulse the society,” they understood their purpose.222 As Madison
states in Federalist 51, security for both civil and religious rights consists in “the
multiplicity of interests, and in the …multiplicity of sects.”223 The greater the number of
interests and sects, the greater the security afforded to liberty. Pluralism’s removal, on the
other hand, would likely threaten the public good, private rights, or the spirit and form of
popular government; it would signify that a “tyranny of the majority” had come to
fruition.224 Yet, as Madison explains, a removal of pluralism and the multiplicity of
interests is unlikely. After all, “the extended republic of the United States” embraces a
“great variety of interests, parties, and sects.”225
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At this point one can begin to see that tension and the conflict of interests were
regarded as necessary, rather than detrimental, for the protection and maintenance of the
American republic, a system centered on popular government and committed to both
private rights and the public good. Understanding this allows one to more fully appreciate
the significance behind the statement of Federalist 51 that “ambition must be made to
counteract ambition.” Every aspect of the American apparatus of government seems to
have been designed with this idea in mind.
Additionally, the Founding Fathers accepted that tension and conflict could
actually be remarkably positive. In The People of Paradox, Michael Kammen points out
that upon accepting the speakership of the Virginia House of Burgesses in 1734, John
Randolph remarked “that counterpointed opinions were necessary and ‘of all things the
most useful.’…Because ‘then we shall hear one another patiently, put the Weight of
every Man’s Reason in the Balance against our own, and at last form a Judgment upon
the whole matter.’”226 Another example readily comes to mind. In a letter to Madison,
Thomas Jefferson famously stated that under democracy men enjoy liberty and
happiness, but he also explains that democratic government is laden with tension and
conflict. However, while he acknowledges tension as the inevitable negative product of
democracy, he recognizes and fleshes out how it can actually be quite beneficial. He
states,
It has its evils too: the principal of which is the turbulence
to which it is subject…Malo periculosam, libertatem quam
quietam servitutem. Even this evil is productive of good. It
prevents the degeneracy of government, and nourishes a
general attention to the public affairs. I hold it that a little
rebellion now and then is a good thing, and as necessary in
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the political world as storms in the physical. Unsuccessful
rebellions indeed generally establish the encroachments on
the rights of the people which have produced them. An
observation of this truth should render honest republican
governors so mild in their punishment of rebellions, as not
to discourage them too much. It is a medicine necessary for
the sound health of government."227
Jefferson accepts tension and conflict as an inevitable “evils” of democratic government.
But “even this evil is productive of good.”228 Tension, and ensuing conflicts, what
Jefferson calls “turbulence,” will check government’s power over the people who
constitute it, prevent encroachments of civil rights and liberties, and will ensure that
citizens stay involved in public affairs, all of which are necessary for the maintenance of
liberal democracy.
Madison, Randolph, and Jefferson, along with the Founding Generation as a
whole, seem to have recognized and put forward the second major tenet of agonism – that
tension is necessary and positive for the maintenance of democracy. And it is my main
assertion that they fashioned the American polity in a form that permitted,
institutionalized, and at times even fostered tension with this conviction in mind. As
Richard Hofstadter states in The American Political Tradition that the founding fathers
assumed a “Hobbesian war of each against all,”229 in which society was characterized by
tension between competing and clashing interests. However, “they did not propose to put
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an end to this war, but merely to stabilize it and make it less murderous.”230 In this effort,
tension, and dissension were thoroughly woven into the fabric of the American polity,
and remain there to this day. Having arrived at this point, the chapter will now turn to
uncovering how and where tension manifests within the American polity, focusing
primarily on its countervailing institutions, its vibrant partisan and interest group politics,
its dualistic principles, and the paradoxical character of American citizens and statesmen.
Institutions of Government
The first and most obvious place in which one can identify tension in the
American polity is in its celebrated institutions of government. Tension can be identified
in the system of federalism and in the separation of powers that characterize the structure
of the Federal government. I assert that these institutions of the American polity were
fashioned, and now function, with a profound understanding of the inevitability of
conflict and tension among interests, and the beneficial potential of such conflict and
tension. These institutions highlight that the American political system takes to heart that
“where counterpointed tendencies were inevitable, both society and polity could benefit
from healthy tensions embodied in a natural system of checks and balances.”231
First, the system of federalism emphasizes an accommodation and appreciation of
tension within American political institutions. Federalism, as pointed out by Tocqueville,
is at its core a system of rivalry. The Constitution of 1789 devised a system that divided
sovereignty in a “complex and difficult”232 manner. The arrangement, in which “each of
the States which had composed the Union should continue to govern itself in all that

230

Ibid

231Kammen,
232

93
Tocqueville, 86

72

concerned its internal prosperity, whilst the entire nation, represented by the Union,
should continue to form a compact body, and to provide for all general exigencies,” was
implemented as a “middle course… which brought together by force two systems
theoretically irreconcilable.”233
Tocqueville details that during the establishment of the Federal Constitution two
opinions pervaded – one proposed a congress, or a league of independent states; the other
advocated the union of the citizens of the colonies into one people, and established one
government that would act as the sole representative of the whole nation. The system of
federalism is the compromise struck between these opposing opinions, one that forced
these two competing interests together, sustaining them in a manageable tension, rather
than finding either interest to truly dominate or forming a precise mean between them.
This is evident in Madison’s words on federalism at the end of Federalist 39 –
The proposed Constitution, therefore, even when tested by
the rules laid down by its antagonists, is, in strictness,
neither a national nor a federal Constitution, but a
composition of both. In its foundation it is federal, not
national; in the sources from which the ordinary powers of
the government are drawn, it is partly federal and partly
national; in the operation of these powers, it is national, not
federal; in the extent of them, again, it is federal, not
national; and, finally, in the authoritative mode of
introducing amendments, it is neither wholly federal nor
wholly national.234
Therefore, as Tocqueville states, under federalism, “two sovereignties are necessarily in
presence of each other,”235 that of the States and that of the national government. They
will inevitably collide and conflict over their appropriate areas of jurisdiction and
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authority. (In fact, Tocqueville sees these contests as one of the principal reasons for
creating the Supreme Court, as one of its duties is “to maintain the balance of power
between the two rival governments, as it had been established by the constitution.”236)
But despite this unavoidable conflict, the contentious arrangement established by
the system of federalism “has not hitherto produced those evils which might have been
feared.”237 Obviously, how the system has precisely worked has shifted over the years, as
seen through shifts between what political scientists label as dual, “layer-cake,”
federalism and cooperative, “marble-cake,” federalism. However, this only further
emphasizes how the system of federalism institutionalizes the tension between state and
national interests, and makes it navigable, which, in turn, helps maintain and stabilize
American democracy.
Second, the structure of the Federal government also emphasizes that tension is
accommodated and appreciated within the institutions of American democracy. Through
the separation of powers, and the checks and balances of the government’s tripartite
structure, tension and conflict inevitably arise between the branches of the federal
government. In addition, tension can be identified within the branches themselves –
especially the legislative branch, although perhaps the judicial branch to a lesser degree
as well. The following paragraphs will explain both of these statements in order to
underscore how an accommodation and appreciation of tension is central to the structure
and institutions of American government.
Madison opens Federalist 51 by explaining the purpose behind the separation of
powers. He states, “by so contriving the interior structure of the government as that its
236
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several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each
other in their proper places,”238 an appropriate distribution of power may be maintained.
The Founders “feared concentration of powers in a single branch.”239 Moreover, they
were concerned that federal power would become too strong and would come to infringe
on individual liberties. The Constitution, therefore, was designed so that each branch –
the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary – would have “a will of its own”240 and
that the will of each would thwart that of the others. One can identify the origins of the
branches’ wills in the Constitution's Articles I, II, and III which outline each branch’s
specific powers. Through this system of rivalry, not only would one branch be prevented
from growing too strong, but the entire government would be reined in so that it did not
infringe on the liberty of the people. Ultimately, therefore, what the Founders sought to
do was to place internal checks on government and its power for an appropriate balance
of power and the maintenance of liberty under American democracy. Tension and
conflict between the branches constituted such a check.
But how do these tensions actually manifest? All legislative powers are granted to
the United States Congress in Article I of the Constitution; as outlined by Article II,
executive powers go to the President; Article III specifies that judicial powers are
reserved for the Supreme Court, and the judicial system under it. This formal distribution
of power and authority make the three branches seem very distinct. However, the authors
of the Constitution also included a significant number of checks through which the
branches inhibit each other’s primary function. Through these the branches begin to
238
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collide. Examples include the President’s ability to veto legislation, Congress’ ability to
override such a veto, the requirement, under Article II, Section 2, of Senate advice and
consent of Presidential appointments, Senate ratification of treaties, the Judiciary’s ability
to strike down laws as unconstitutional, Congress’ ability to put forward new
constitutional amendments, the list continues. What all of these emphasize is that, while
the branches are distinct, they do not operate in isolation; the Constitution makes that
impossible. And it is in these constitutionally established contact zones, where the
branches interact, that tension manifests.241
In Democracy in America, Tocqueville notes the tension that arises through the
separation of powers. He explains that the different branches of the federal government,
namely the legislature and the executive are often at odds. For instance, later in the
chapter, “The Federal Constitution,” in discussing the role of the Supreme Court,
Tocqueville remarks that “the executive” will turn to the Courts “for assistance against
the encroachments of the legislative power,” and the “Legislature demands” the Court’s
“protection against the assaults of the Executive.”242 A modern example may help to
emphasize how tension arises between branches. The 2014 Supreme Court case National
Labor Relations Board v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. ___ (2014) was, most basically, a
dispute between the legislative and executive branches. In this particular case, Congress
and the President were at odds over the President’s power to make recess appointments.
President Obama made four appointments during the 2011-2012 Holiday recess, claiming
his authority to do so under the recess appointments clause. Congress, Senate
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Republicans in particular, held that President Obama had exceeded the constitutional
authority given to him under the recess appointments clause, as the appointments were
made while the Senate was holding pro forma sessions every three days (most likely in
an effort to prevent the President making any recess appointments). Therefore, while the
case involved a much more complex and intricate set of facts, it was, at its core, really
about friction between the legislative and executive branches. As Justice Scalia stated in
his concurring opinion, “this issue has been the subject of a long-simmering inter-branch
conflict.”243
Ultimately, as Epstein and Walker assert in their chapter on the separation of
powers in Constitutional Law for a Changing America, the Framers structured the federal
government to achieve some sort of balanced government through the friction between
the three branches of government. However, the conflicts and struggles for power
between branches all occur within in the constitutional framework, an agreed upon
system and set of procedures. As such, the multitude of checks and balances between the
branches allow conflict to wage on within the Federal government without threatening to
dissolve it altogether. I believe this arrangement seems quite akin to Chantal Mouffe’s
statement in The Democratic Paradox that, under agonal theory, conflict should only
“take place within a social framework that allows those in conflict to envision themselves
as part of a shared order, even as they are encouraged to contest this same order. Thus
conflict “needs to take a form that does not destroy the political association.””244 Under
the arrangement of the separation of powers, the three branches of the U.S. federal
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government all exist within an agreed upon social framework. But, as evidenced by the
NLRB v. Noel Canning case, they continually debate and contest this order.
Tension is not only tangible among the branches, but within the branches as well.
For instance, tension is evident within the legislative branch, between the Senate and the
House of Representatives. As Michael Kammen outlines in People of Paradox, “The
Founders created a bicameral body so that it would expressly embrace contradictions.
The House was dedicated to the propositions of majority rule, and the Senate to the
sacredness of minority rights.”245 The Senate was composed to favor the principle of the
independence of the states, as each state was allotted two representatives, regardless of
population or size. The House, on the other hand, was formed with the sovereignty of the
whole nation in mind, as representation in that chamber is proportional to population.
And, as Alexis de Tocqueville states in Democracy in America, given this inconsistency,
“the minority of the nation in the Senate may paralyze the decisions of the majority
represented in the other House,”246 emphasizing that relations between the two chambers
may not always be harmonious.
Similar statements about discord could be made regarding the judicial branch. The
Supreme Court is not composed of nine identically thinking jurors. Instead, its members,
its operations, and even its decisions are marked by difference, dissension, and debate.
Similarly, if one looks beyond the Supreme Court, at the judiciary as a whole, there is
hardly unanimity. For instance, there was incredible division among lower court rulings
on “gay marriage” up until 2014, division that highlights that tension and dissension are
evident within the judicial branch. Additionally, the fact that the judiciary has the means
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to alleviate this tension – an ultimate decision from the Supreme Court – does not mean
that the tension among divergent rulings, various legal arguments, or conflicting
philosophies of constitutional interpretation, is permanently quelled. It simply indicates
that the multitude of conflicting legal opinions within the United States exist within a set
framework to which they all agree implicitly. Their discord is institutionalized, but it is
discord nonetheless. Obviously, the executive branch does not exhibit internal tensions
to the same extent as the legislative or judicial branch. But this is to be expected, as the
Executive Branch is under the more unilateral authority of the President.
Having emphasized that tension exists both among the three branches of the
federal government, and within the legislative and judicial branches themselves, it can be
logically concluded that, ultimately, these tensions are beneficial for American
government on the whole. The presence of tension among and within the branches
indicates that a multiplicity of interests is present in government, that no one branch,
chamber, party, group, or person, dominate, and, therefore, that power is not overly
consolidated and abused. Further, it may help to prevent the subjugation of individual
freedoms to federal authority.
Additionally, sustained tension among and within the branches of government
gives the federal government an adaptable nature; the constant “back and forth” allows
for the balance of power to shift, provided that this is accomplished within an agreed
upon framework. For instance, as history suggests, at times when national security seems
threatened, power may pull in the direction of the President and his executive branch. In
times of peace, however, the legislative branch may fight to reclaim power and authority.
At the same time as they make it adaptable, the tensions that are central to the structure
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and organization of American government can prevent such changes from happening too
quickly, too rashly, or too permanently. Again, as Madison explained in Federalist 51,
“the several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping
each other in their proper places.”247 Therefore, the tensions produced by the separation
of powers, which characterize the federal government, seem to secure a remarkable
balance of temperate adaptability that will allow the United States government to move
forward through a changing world while always retaining levels of stability. This
institutionalized tension, therefore, appears to give American democracy both a sense of
vitality and a shot at longevity, which harkens back to Machiavelli’s statement that the
stability and longevity of the Roman republic was a product of the tension existing
between the Senate and the people, and that it was this that kept the republic free, and
allowed it to avoid stagnancy and delay decay.
The tangible presence and appreciation of tension in the American institutions of
federalism and the separations of powers emphasize the more agonal aspects of American
government. Agonists believe that the task of politics is to channel tension and conflict
through institutions and processes that serve as “a political outlet within a pluralistic
democratic system.”248 As the above paragraphs show, the institutions of federalism and
the separation of powers do just that. Both federalism and the separation of powers
doctrine carve out a place for contest and dissent within the apparatus of government.
This, agonists like Mouffe argue, is “vital for a pluralist democracy.”249 Moreover,
American institutions of government work to foster unity, but do so in contexts of
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conflict and diversity.250 Compromises in American politics occur when facilitated
through these institutions, but these compromises are simply “temporary respites in an
ongoing confrontation,”251 an eternal confrontation that is acknowledged and sustained
because it is regarded to be (at least) inevitable and (at most) beneficial for American
Government.
Party and Interest Group Politics
American party and interest group politics also emphasize that the American
polity features and respects tension within politics. Political parties and interest groups
are at the center of American political processes, from elections, to law making. In
Democracy in America, Tocqueville notes the seemingly perpetual tension between the
various competing parties and interests groups that exist under American democratic
pluralism. Tocqueville states, “In America, the liberty of association for political
purposes is unlimited.”252 And his comments on the advantages of the contests that arise
from pluralism in democracies, generally, which were explored in the previous chapter,
clearly hold true when discussing American democracy, specifically.
In noting the vast number of political interests that vibrant pluralism produces in
America, Tocqueville states, “No sooner do you set foot upon American ground, than
you are stunned by a kind of tumult; a confused clamor is heard on every side; and a
thousand simultaneous voices demand the satisfaction of their social wants. Everything is
in motion around you.”253 As described, the Americans seem to be the opposite of the
“flock of timid and industrious animals” that the people would compose under “soft
250
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despotism.” Moreover, Tocqueville notes, “the unrestrained liberty of political
association has not hitherto produced, in the United States, the fatal results, which might
be expected.”254
Undoubtedly, both the two-party system and interest group politics generally are
marked by constant rivalry and discord. Partisan and interest group politics allow the
multitude of interests that exist in American society to consolidate and be expressed with
efficiency and strength. But they also provide a more formal setting, which allows the
warring opinions of the American electorate to rage in a controlled fashion. To see this
one only need look at national elections. Every four years, the American voting
population divides into (typically) two groups, divided along party lines, which, as two
scholars comment, “fight a word battle for control of the government.”255 Following this
“war of opinion,”256 power is handed to the victor peacefully. Therefore, parties and
interest groups, as well as their contests, emphasize that there is tension between political
ideas and policy preferences, but that this tension plays out in a systemized process; it is
another example of the idea behind ‘ambition to counteract ambition.’ Thus, one can
recognize party and interest group politics as an additional accommodation and
appreciation of tension within American Government.
Political Principles
Having looked at formal, concrete institutions of American government, as well
as party and interest group politics, I will now turn to identifying tension within a more
abstract arena – American political principles. Louis Hartz states in his book, The Liberal
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Tradition in America, “American political thought, as we have seen, is a veritable maze
of polar contradictions, winding in and out of each other hopelessly.”257 Hartz identifies a
number of competing principles. These include “pragmatism and absolutism, historicism,
and rationalism, optimism and pessimism, materialism and idealism, individualism and
conformism.”258 Hartz is not alone in recognizing the often contradictory nature of
American political principles. Michael Kammen in The People of Paradox quotes Erik H.
Erikson, a prominent psychoanalyst, who says, “it is a commonplace to state that
whatever one may come to consider a truly American trait can be shown to have its
equally characteristic opposite.”259 Kammen considers American domestic political
values to be dualistic in nature. He states, “we are comfortable believing in both majority
rule and minority rights, in both consensus and freedom, federalism and
centralization…Americans have managed to be both puritanical and hedonistic, idealistic
and materialistic, peace-loving and war-mongering, isolationist and interventionist,
conformist and individualist, consensus-minded and conflict-prone.”260 But just as
Kammen clarifies, Americans political culture does not just accommodate these polarities
by adopting some sort of mean between them. Instead, as Kammen points out, “It may be
perfectly reasonable to support majority rule with reservations, or minority rights with
certain other reservations. But this has not been our method. Rather, we have tended to
hold contradictory ideas in suspension.”261 I agree with the authors I’ve quoted above.
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These tensions, and the resulting paradoxes that appear in American political
thought, seem to be an actualization of something akin to Chantal Mouffe’s “democratic
paradox,” discussed in the earlier chapter on agonism. The American form of political
society is one whose precise “specificity comes from the articulation between”262 various
pairings of distinct, sometimes opposing, traditions. I agree with both Mouffe and
Tocqueville that one of the most obvious examples is the pairing of democratic equality
and liberty within the American political tradition.
Richard Hofstadter points out in The American Political Tradition that “modern
American folklore assumes that democracy and liberty are all but identical, and when
democratic writers take the trouble to make the distinction, they usually assume that
democracy is necessary to liberty.”263 Both the principle of democracy and the principle
of liberty are undoubtedly are at the backbone of American political thought, but as
Tocqueville and Mouffe have indicated, democracy, which emphasizes equality, and
liberty, which emphasizes freedom, are not the same and, in fact, often reside in contrast
to one another.
This tension between the political principles of equality and liberty manifests
itself in many modern political debates. For instance, take campaign finance – Those who
ascribe more value to the political principle of equality are inclined to see the negatives
of big money and politics. They will point out that it biases the political process to favor
the rich, allowing them to exert greater influence over elections and the political process.
They will say it undermines true popular sovereignty and, therefore, democracy. On the
other side, some favor the notion of liberty. These voices may expound the importance of
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first amendment rights and of people’s freedom to put their resources (read: money)
towards causes (read: candidates) as they wish. As such, to this day, the political
principles of equality and liberty can lead Americans to vastly different policy positions,
despite both values being integral to the other’s existence and at the core of American
democracy.
Other contradicting principles have similar effects, placing Americans on
opposing sides of political debates. At times, this division may make the country slow to
act. But, as Michael Kammen outlines, “our experience with polarities provides us with
the potential for flexibility and diversity.”264 The dualistic nature of American political
principles emphasizes how important tension and opposition are to American society.
Tension transcends America’s political superstructures and can be found in the
subterranean depths of American society in the dualistic principles and values that
constitute the American psyche.
Individual Statesmen and Citizens
Additionally, while tension is evident in the American psyche in a broad, nationwide sense, tension can also appear in the psyche of individual Americans. Coats asserts
in “A Theory of Republican Character” that republican character is characterized by an
uneasy tension. He states, “the distinctive characteristic of this personality is the attempt
at a commonsensical balance between those extremes which are inescapable.”265
Applying this idea to the American example, I assert that American character, 266 as a
specific form of republican character, is definitely distinguished by the presence of
264

Kammen in Lanahan Readings, 33
Wendell John Jr,. A Theory of Republican Character , p. 58 n. 91
266 Throughout this section, I will be taking character, as Coats does, to mean “a pattern of fairly settled
perspectives, habits, and characteristics in individuals, itself the outcome of some combination of
upbringing, education, experience, and self-motivation.” (Coats, A Theory of Republican Character, 15)
265Coats,

85

tension. Moreover, I agree with Coats that the distinctive characteristic of Americans’
personality is their attempts at a balance between extremes which are unavoidable,
although I doubt that the balance they procure will always be commonsensical. After all,
as two writers observed, “it is characteristic of the American mind to hold contradictory
ideas without bothering to resolve the conflicts between them.”267
In the United States, as outlined above, tension is “institutionalized in a
fundamental law”268 in political practices, and, moreover, is a distinguishing feature of
American political thought. It’s hardly surprising, therefore, that tension characterizes
American citizens. However, as Michael Kammen points out, “conflicts between
Americans have been visible for a very long time, but most of us are just beginning to
perceive the conflicts within us individually.”269
First looking at average American citizens, a state of tension clearly marks their
character. This state of tension emerges from their attempts to maintain “a healthy tension
among the poles or dimensions of various intersecting axes,”270 for instance, between
what one deems to be best for the “public good” and one’s own private interests. Ideally,
these two are synonymous, but that may not always be the case. Additionally, tension
may arise between the goal of self-reliance, or autonomy, and duty of being actively
invested in politics and focused on community. A few more contradictions come to mind:
American citizens are asked to honor tradition, but urge on progress; protect and promote
their own beliefs, while never attacking anyone else’s. Michael Kammen outlines a few
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other tensions that American individuals accommodate or feature. He names, “a large
cluster of biformities,” including, “the conservative liberalism of our political life, the
pragmatic idealism of our cerebral life, the emotional rationalism of our spiritual life, and
godly materialism of our acquisitive life.”271
“Moderate” citizens may be characterized by an even greater accommodation or
appreciation of tension. Both David Brooks and former Senator Olympia Snowe, who
write to summon the “silent majority” (i.e. moderates) to help mitigate political
polarization and the ensuing gridlock (which will be discussed in this study’s
conclusion), put forward an idea that proper moderates will be individual political actors
who successfully accommodate, even internalize, political tension. Brooks and Snowe
are, therefore, calling moderates to action because of their unique ability to accommodate
the contentious disputes that divide our political system and facilitate a balance capable
of overcoming political stagnation.
As was mentioned in the Introduction, in one of his “op-ed” pieces in the New
York Times, entitled “What Moderation Means,” Brooks states, “in most great arguments,
there are two partially true points of view, which sit in tension. The moderate tries to
maintain a rough proportion between them, to keep her country along its historic
trajectory.”272 Brooks’ moderate is impressive. His moderate is able to “preserve the
tradition of conflict, keeping the opposing sides balanced.”273 The moderate can
successfully maintain a balance among the many things that Brooks identifies, (as I
have,) as lying in opposition within modern American democracy - equality vs.
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achievement; centralization vs. decentralization; order and community vs. liberty and
individualism; individual opportunity vs. social cohesion; local rights vs. federal power.
Brooks goes on to clarify that “being moderate does not mean being tepid…The best
moderates can smash partisan categories and be hard-charging in two directions
simultaneously.”274 Certainly this marks an agonistic conception of moderation. Olympia
Snowe puts forth a similar description of an ideal “moderate” in her book Fighting for
Common Ground. Snowe, who extensively quotes Brooks in her chapter on moderation,
adds that “moderates” have a “willingness to live with a compromise, even if it includes
policies they disagree with, if it facilitates the passage of legislation that ultimately will
move the country forward.”275 It is the moderate’s responsibility, therefore, to bridge the
gap between policies, and to accommodate the tensions that exist between them.
Moreover, there is historical precedent for this sort of agonistic moderation. As explained
by Hofstadter, the Founding Fathers had an image of themselves as “moderate
republicans, standing between political extremes.”276
Having mentioned the Founding Fathers, the first American statesmen, it is
important to note that it is perhaps American statesmen who are the individuals most
characterized by tension in the United States. To clarify, I am using the term “statesmen”
to simply describe preeminent politicians or public officials. American statesmen must
balance the polarities and paradoxes that citizens confront, albeit they must balance these
to a different, perhaps greater, extent. Instead of merely balancing the “public good”
with their own private interests, they are asked to balance the warring private interests of
274
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others to somehow secure the greatest amount of possible good for the public. American
statesman must also, like Brooks’ and Snowe’s “moderates,” find a way to facilitate
equilibrium or compromise between adverse policy positions and to transform politics
and debate into policy and action.
Additionally, statesmen must embrace and exhibit qualities that often are
paradoxical or contradictory. As Michael Kammen states in People of Paradox,
“Americans expect their heroes to be Everyman and Superman simultaneously.”277
Kammen also outlines that American heroes, which I’ll deem to include those whom I’m
calling statesmen, must be virtuous, but also capable of necessary evil. “The
quintessential American hero wears both a halo and horns.”278 In this vein, the American
statesman may be called to evoke some Machiavellian characteristics; they need be both
fox and lion, both feared and loved.
Thomas Cronin and Michael Genovese’s comments in The Paradoxes of the
American Presidency also emphasize the contradictions and tensions, which characterize
the qualities of American statesmanship. (Admittedly, I’m assuming that American
presidents qualify as American statesmen and that Cronin and Genovese’s words on
presidents can be applied to statesmen more broadly). Cronin and Genovese describe the
American presidency as a “complex, multidimensional, even contradictory institution.”279
But they also assert that it is essential to American government. Most basically, they
understand the presidency “as a series of paradoxes, clashing expectations, and
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contradictions.”280 As I’ve stated above, I believe these comments can be extended to the
broader category of American statesmen, rather than just presidents. To turn again to the
words of Cronin and Genovese,
In the United States, “leaders live with contradictions
…Leadership situations commonly require successive
displays of contrary or divergent forces. Living with, even
embracing, contradictions is a sign of political and personal
maturity. The effective leader understands the presence of
opposites. The aware leader, much like a first-rate
conductor, knows when to bring in various sections, knows
when and how to turn the volume up and down, and learns
how to balance opposing sections to achieve desired
results.”281
Moreover, statesmen must embody characteristics that appear at ends to gain the trust,
and the votes, of the American people. The need to embody contradictory qualities is
surely facilitated by pluralism. The multiplicity of opinions and interests present in the
United States makes for equally abundant and diverse expectations of our leaders. For
instance, Cronin and Genovese outline nine paradoxes that statesmen, presidents
specifically, must incorporate in their public personhood. They are as follows:
First, they are to be powerful and effective, capable of solving the nation's most
critical dilemmas, yet are to be limited by law and unable to infringe on individual liberty
or to become a tyrant. Second, they must exhibit democratic, average, behavior, while
still being uncommonly heroic. This reckons back to the quote by Michael Kammen cited
earlier that American heroes must be “Everyman and Superman simultaneously.”282
Third, they must be empathetic and compassionate at times, but at other times ruthless
and tough. Fourth, they must appear above petty politics, yet be able to successfully
280
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navigate the political, and partisan, system, which they head. The fifth, similar to the
fourth, they are to be a unifying force, while also serving as head of their political party
and advocating for its policies. Sixth, they are to be idealistic and to operate in universals,
yet pragmatic and programmatic. Seventh, they must be confident, but certainly not
arrogant; they must be self-assured, yet humble. Eighth, the qualities needed to get
elected and those needed to govern may, in fact, be different. The ninth and final paradox
presented by Cronin and Genovese calls back to the first – it is the idea that they must be
at times strong, at others weak; preferably, they will appear to be both.
Having fleshed through all of Cronin and Genovese’s paradoxes and discussed the
other tensions that statesmen must accommodate, one can truly appreciate how sustained
tensions characterize American statesmen. In A Theory of Republican Character, Coats
says of his “republican character,” “on this reading, then, the human condition is a
manageable tension at its best, susceptible to only intermittent moments of resolution.”283
The above paragraphs emphasize that this thought accurately describes the character of
American citizens, and moderates and statesmen in particular. As Kammen states in
People of Paradox, “in the United States, the human condition – which is everywhere
paradoxical to be sure – has been given unusual freedom to vacillate permissively
between possible poles.”284 This understanding emphasizes that the paradoxical character
of American citizens and statesmen is a manifestation of the larger theme of tension and
conflict that is woven throughout the American Polity.
Having explored how and where tension appears in the United States’
countervailing institutions of federalism and the separation of powers, in its vibrant
283
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partisan and interest group politics, in its dualistic political principles, and in the
paradoxical character of its citizens and statesmen, it is not difficult to understand
statements like that made by Italian author Raoul Romoli-Venturi, who Kammen quotes
as saying, “all the tensions of the world have been imported by the United States.”285
Tension is an essential element of democracy in America. Understanding this is generally
useful as it allows one to begin to “tie together all the themes and facts in American
Government,”286 which may often seem inconsistent and paradoxical. But it is especially
helpful for this study, as it emphasizes that the American experiment in democracy
features agonistic qualities.
First, American democracy can be identified as agonistic in that it embraces
pluralism as inevitable and accepts that tension, discord, conflict, and paradox will arise
from pluralism. Moreover, the American polity espouses this tension, treating it as
necessary, even positive, for the maintenance of democracy. To again borrow words from
Coats, the stability of the American mixed republic “resides in the equilibrium between
opposing forces – between dependence and independence, order and liberty, energy and
stability, ambition and ambition, duty and interest, branches of government, the militia
and the regular army, principles of proportional and equal representation, commerce and
agriculture, differing commercial interests, religious denominations, and so on.”287 While
this study has only addressed a few of the opposing forces listed above, the examples it
has explored emphasize that tension is by no means treated as negative in the American
case; American democracy does not eschew tension. Rather, as this chapter has shown,
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the American system institutionalizes tension, conflict, and contradiction in its
establishments, traditions, principles, and people.
The notion of institutionalizing tension reinforces the identification of the
American experiment in democracy as notably agonistic. In his book Institutionalizing
Agonistic Democracy, Ed Wingenbach states, “agonistic democrats embrace the need for
a political order within which conflict can occur in a sustainable and contingently
legitimated fashion.”288 He juxtaposes this with other radical democrats, who denounce
the political utility of formal institutions. Agonal theory accepts and appreciates tension,
but only to the extent that it can exist within the confines of an established system.
Agonal theory believes that tension can be beneficial when it is institutionalized because
it can then “transform as much as possible the violence engendered by either anarchy or
exclusion into forces that productively inform democratic decision-making.”289 The
Founding Fathers, as Richard Hofstadter points out, saw democracy as a transitional stage
of government.290 They believed it was apt to evolve into either anarchy or tyranny. They
designed the American mixed regime, therefore, to channel the energies, which could
lead the country towards anarchy or tyranny, into the democratic process instead, giving
it a stable, yet raw, energetic vitality. As a result, and as this chapter has exposed,
conflict, opposition, and paradox are tangible throughout the American polity to this very
day.
A final point helps to reaffirm American democracy as agonistic. Consensus can,
and must, exist in America. Moreover, although recent events suggest otherwise,
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generally it is sought after in America, especially in times of crisis. However, consensus
is acknowledged to be temporary and fleeting. Consensus may be reached on one
provision of one piece of legislation, on one broader policy, on one aspect of the
relationship between the branches, on the existence of one political principle, or on one
idea that is judged to be in the interest of the “common good”. But consensus is never
universal or permanent. Moreover, consensus is not the ultimate goal of all American
politics. Rather, consensus is simply momentary agreement or compromise that results
from the process of politics. The ultimate goal of politics would seem then to be more
politics, because the continuation of political activity represents the survival of the
political system and of democracy as well.
The preceding three paragraphs explain the claim made in the introduction to this
chapter that the American experiment in democracy is, more specifically, an experiment
in agonistic democracy. This fact makes a good deal of sense when one considers that the
Founding Fathers, and the nation they fashioned, were greatly influenced by the thinkers
discussed in the second chapter. Therefore, having concluded by restating the claim that
this chapter sought to defend, I’ll close this chapter with the words of one of the writers
that greatly informed this chapter of my study, Michael Kammen, who provides a
beautiful description of the agonal quality of American democracy: “America historically
has achieved the ultimate stability of an arch: those very forces which are logically
calculated to drag stones to the ground actually provides props of support – derived from
a principle in which thrust and counter-thrust become means of counterpoise.”291
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CONCLUSION
The State of Disunion292
“Every difference of opinion is not a difference of
principle. We have called by different names brethren of
the same principle. We are all Republicans. We are all
Federalists.”
–Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address
For two centuries in the United States of America, tension appears to have
accomplished that which Machiavelli, Mouffe, and others believe it is capable of. Over
its 239-year lifespan, the American republic has been marked by vitality, stability, and
has had a sense that it would outlast time, with one notable exception – the Civil War.
During the Civil War, the tensions, conflicts, and paradoxes that characterize the United
States’ government, principles, and people, morphed from what Mouffe deems agonistic
into what she deems antagonistic; in other words, tensions shifted from being struggles or
competitions between opponents to being, quite literally, violent fights between mortal
enemies. Herein, rather than providing the United States with vitality and stability,
tension threatened to tear the republic apart. That moment of history prompts one to
harken back to Machiavelli’s warning that, although tension provides vitality and
longevity, it also will eventually destroy a republic.
The Civil War, when tensions threatened to destroy the republic, marked the first
time that the United States experienced a full on confrontation of the problem of
maintaining the stability of its ideas and institutions. The Civil War, therefore, constituted
what J.G.A Pocock calls a “Machiavellian Moment.” This signifies a moment in the life
of a republic when it realizes that it too is mortal. Pocock describes a “Machiavellian
Moment” as “the moment in conceptualized time in which the republic was seen as
292
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confronting its own temporal finitude, as attempting to remain morally and politically
stable in a stream of irrational events conceived as essentially destructive of all systems
of secular stability.”293 The Civil War certainly brought the United States to its knees and
forced it to recognize its own mortality. This is evident in what are, perhaps, the most
famous words of this era – the words of the Gettysburg Address. In the Gettysburg
Address, Lincoln stated that the great task before the United states was to experience “a
new birth of freedom” to ensure “that government of the people, by the people, for the
people, shall not perish from the earth.”294 This implies a recognition that “government of
the people, by the people, for the people,” i.e. American democracy, was deemed to be at
risk of perishing. Herein, the Civil War, the moment in United States history when
tension escalated to a point where it threatened to destroy the republic, constituted
America’s first “Machiavellian Moment.” The question is whether we’re approaching
another.
In the years following the Civil War, particularly in the wake of both World Wars,
the United States seemed to have forgotten, or at least ignored, its mortality once more.
For the larger part of the twentieth century, American democracy appeared to consider
itself almost timeless, protected by Providence, and even, at the most extreme, to be a
millennialist realization. However, today such an outlook does not seem to be
overwhelmingly, or obviously, apparent. I do not mean to imply that America fully
accepts, much less understands, its own mortality. But if one were to naively ask a
roomful of my peers whether they believed the United States was immortal, they would
likely hear a chorus of “No’s” or, at least, an ominous silence. Our own mortality, as a
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nation, does not seem to be staring us in the face as it did during the Civil War, but it
does seem to be lurking in the shadows of this American life.
There appears to be a notable concern for the current state, and the future, of the
American republic. And at the core of this concern is a worry over the current nature of
the tension ingrained in American political society. In other words, there is concern about
the state of our agonistic democracy. Has the nature of the tension central to the
American republic changed? And if so how?
I believe that at the hand of polarization, the nature of the tension within the
American polity is changing. Presently, American politics are housed in the extremes.
This means that the tensions that lay at the heart of political society in the United States
have become more pronounced. As I see it, polarization takes agonal politics –
characterized by conflict and dissension between adversaries – and turns them into an
antagonistic politics, in which others are now enemies. Why is this? There have always
been divisions within the United States. What about today’s modern polarized climate
makes them so stark?
My suggestion is that perhaps the political phenomenon of polarization signifies a
broader trend, a trend in which Americans no longer universally honor the same
principles or ends of government. It has been observed that for the majority of United
States history – the Civil War era excluded – American citizens, and their statesmen,
venerated a single set of principles, along with institutions that functioned for these
principles. As discussed in the last chapter, some of the principles contradict each other.
Nonetheless, it appeared as though the majority of the American populace believed in and
accommodated all these principles, and willingly navigated and negotiated their
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paradoxes. Dissension and debate, therefore, centered around which policies would best
bring about the realization of these universal principles. American politics was Mouffe’s
‘conflictual consensus’ come to life; there was a general agreement on what ‘ethicopolitical principles’ were – say liberty and equality – but disagreement “concerning the
meaning and implementation of those principles.”295 Moreover, there was a sense that
opposition was legitimate, and a willingness to continue forward with the opposition in a
mutual struggle. Now, however, it seems that one side of the populace favors one set of
principles and the other favors another. Dissension and debate have, therefore, become
centered on advocating for one set of principles, while discrediting the other. Moreover,
there is a pervasive sense that opposition is illegitimate, and sometimes not worthy
enough to engage with.
Thomas Jefferson remarked in his First Inaugural Address, “every difference of
opinion is not a difference of principle. We have called by different names brethren of the
same principle. We are all Republicans. We are all Federalists.”296 It seems that the
sentiment behind this statement is beginning to hold true no longer. Rather than a state of
union characterized by conflict, dissension, and the maintenance of a reasonable tension,
which provides activity, vitality, and a continuation of a mutual struggle among
competing values and interests, the United States seems to be in a state of disunion,
characterized by the development of an obstinate rift that produces stagnation,
enervation, and a refusal to engage with opposition. It is a reasonable concern, therefore,
that (as Machiavelli warned) the tensions which once made us stable and provided

295
296

Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 102
Jefferson, “Diversity and Unity,” 898

98

vitality and longevity, could be undermining our republic and slowly leading it towards
its second “Machiavellian Moment.”
The underlying goal of this study, therefore, was to explore the contemporary
theory of agonism, and preceding appreciations of political tension, in the hopes of better
understanding the American polity and its current ailments. Perhaps this goal stems from
the idea that you must diagnose and unravel problems before you can fix them. A
thorough examination of agonal theory and previous moments of, and opposition to,
agonistic ideas allows one to understand when political conflict can procure political
health and when it cannot. It leads one to the conclusion that, so long as the United States
remains in an internal, quasi-“cold-war” over what its political principles truly are, it will
struggle to move forward through history, it will lack energy and vitality, and its
longevity will be threatened. For political tension to once more produce positive effects,
it must shift back from being antagonistic in nature, to being agonistic. This, I believe,
can be accomplished. Therefore, while this study opened with a melancholy statement, it
will close with an optimistic one – Political tension can once again provide political
health when we, as a nation, recommit, at some general level, to be “brethren of the same
principle.”
Surely, such a recommitment will take a significant push, perhaps one engendered
by the nation as a whole. Claiming to know how to initiate or execute such a push would
be naïve. Perhaps, however, it starts by asking questions that ask us to look at the big
picture, to step back from the strictly practical and particular, to self-reflect, to face the
abstract and the long-range, and to think deeply. In other words, perhaps by turning to
questions of theory, we may begin to mend our practical maladies.
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